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Abstract  
Since the 1980s there has been a significant increase in polarization between the Republican 
and Democratic parties in the United States Congress. This thesis looks further into the 
increase in polarization in the United States House of Representatives. By using Texas as a 
case the thesis investigate if the congressional district affects the legislators’ ideology, which 
again may explain the increasing polarization.  
 
This thesis addresses two schools of theories of polarization. First are the external theories, 
which are the redistricting-, ideological realignment-, constituent sorting-, economic- and 
party activism explanations. Second is the internal explanation that addresses changes at the 
inside of Congress. In addition research that address changes in Texas politically, 
economically and demographically is included. The different explanations have been 
intensely discussed among scholars of polarization, and an additional part of this thesis has 
been to test some of the external explanations.   
  
The data used is gathered from voteview.com, which estimate legislators’ ideology, and the 
Almanac of American Politics, which provides detailed data from every congressional 
district. By using a Time-Series-Cross-Section design, the thesis clearly finds that there has 
been a significant increase in polarization between the Democratic and Republican parties. 
Another finding is that the Democratic and Republican legislators from Texas have 
traditionally been more conservative than the rest of the House of Representatives, but that 
this has equalized in the past congresses.  
 
By using three different regressions in two models, the thesis finds that the economic 
explanation is the more reliable of the external explanations used in this thesis. It also 
indicates that demography has a part to say. Still the polarization puzzle is too complex to be 
explained by one single explanation, and that the different explanations used in this thesis in 
varying degree contribute in explaining polarization.  
 
    
 
 
 
	   iii	  
Acknowledgements  
 
First and foremost I would like to thank my dear Alma Mater – The University of Bergen – 
for some amazing years as a student in the most beautiful city in the World.   
 
I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Lars G. Svåsand for steady guidance, great 
theoretical input, and interesting discussions throughout the entire writing process. Thanks to 
Associate Professor Michael Tatham and PhD fellow Jon Kåre Skiple for methodological 
input. Thanks to Professor at the University of Texas, Austin, Sean Theriault for deepening 
my knowledge about party polarization, and a great dinner in Houston, Texas.    
 
The master thesis process would not have been the same without the warm companionship of 
my fellow students of both the classes of 2012-2014 and 2013-2015. The two years spent 
behind the old blue walls of Sofie Lindstrøm’s hus have given me new friends, insight and 
knowledge and for that I am grateful.  
 
I would also like to thank my parents for taking their time to read and comment on the thesis, 
and of course for all your support throughout the years. Thanks to friends and family for 
support. I would like to thank Sigga and Heimir and their family for their warm hospitality. 
And of course the Labrador Ugla who always reminds me about the good things in life.          
 
Lastly, the most wonderful part of my life as a master student was that I met Svana. Words 
cannot describe my gratitude for all your support, patience and motivation, Svana. You 
inspire me every day – ástin min.     
 
 
Oslo, May 2015  
Bjørn Kristian Danbolt   
 
 
 
 
 
	   iv	  
Contents  
 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Research Question ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.2. Justification of the thesis .............................................................................................. 2 
1.3. Structure of the thesis ................................................................................................... 3 
 
2. Theoretical framework ..................................................................................................... 4 
2.1. Definition of polarization ............................................................................................. 4 2.1.1.	  	  	  	  	  Elite	  polarization	  ......................................................................................................................	  5	  2.1.2.	  	  	  	  	  Party	  polarization	  .....................................................................................................................	  6	  2.1.3.	  	  	  	  	  Popular	  polarization	  and	  sorting	  of	  voters	  ...................................................................	  7	  2.1.4.	  	  	  	  	  Definition	  of	  Ideology,	  Liberal	  and	  Conservative	  .......................................................	  7	  
2.2. Explanations for party polarization in the United States Congress – external and 
internal ............................................................................................................................ 9 
2.3. External explanations ................................................................................................. 10 2.3.1.	   The	  Redistricting	  explanation	  ...........................................................................................	  10	  2.3.2.	   Ideological	  realignment	  .......................................................................................................	  12	  2.3.3.	   The	  constituent-­‐	  and	  partisan	  sorting	  –	  the	  ideological	  self-­‐sorting	  of	  	  	  	  	  	   voters	  ...........................................................................................................................................	  14	  2.3.4.	   Economic	  explanations	  ........................................................................................................	  19	  2.3.5.	   Extremism	  of	  party	  activists	  ..............................................................................................	  20	  
2.4. Internal explanations .................................................................................................. 25 2.4.1.	   Revival	  of	  party	  cohesion	  and	  replacement	  of	  moderates	  in	  Congress	  ..........	  25	  2.4.2.	   Institutional	  reforms	  .............................................................................................................	  28	  
2.5. The link between the external and internal explanations ........................................... 30 
 
 
 
 
 
	   v	  
3. Selection of case and how the theoretical framework applies to Texas ..................... 31 
3.1. Selection of case – Texas ........................................................................................... 31 3.1.1.	   Redistricting	  of	  the	  congressional	  districts	  in	  Texas	  ..............................................	  32	  3.1.2.	   Ideological	  realignment	  in	  Texas	  .....................................................................................	  35	  3.1.3.	   Constituent	  and	  partisan	  sorting	  in	  Texas	  ...................................................................	  36	  3.1.4.	   Income	  inequality	  in	  Texas	  .................................................................................................	  37	  3.1.5.	   Party	  activism	  in	  Texas	  ........................................................................................................	  39	  3.1.6.	   Other	  factors	  .............................................................................................................................	  40	  
3.2. Overview of hypotheses ............................................................................................. 40 
 
4. Data and method ............................................................................................................. 41 
4.1. Brief overview of methodological approaches and data used in the literature .......... 41 
4.2. A case study or not ..................................................................................................... 42 
4.3. Selection of data ......................................................................................................... 43 4.3.1.	   Legislator	  estimates	  from	  the	  1st	  to	  the	  113th	  United	  States	  Congress	  ...........	  43	  4.3.2.	   Legislator	  estimates	  in	  the	  Texas	  State	  Legislature	  from	  1973-­‐2009	  .............	  44	  4.3.3.	   The	  Almanac	  of	  American	  Politics	  and	  the	  Cook	  Partisan	  Voting	  Index	  .........	  44	  
4.4. Method - Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis .......................................................... 46 4.4.1.	   Panel-­‐data	  or	  not	  panel	  data	  ..............................................................................................	  46	  4.4.2.	   Fixed	  effects	  or	  Random	  effects	  ........................................................................................	  48	  4.4.3.	   Challenges	  and	  assumptions	  when	  working	  with	  TSCS	  and	  panel	  data	  models	  .........................................................................................................................................................	  49	  
 
5. Operationalization of variables ...................................................................................... 52 
5.1. The dependent variable: DW-NOMINATE 1st dimension of the legislators ideological  
position ......................................................................................................................... 52 
5.2. The independent variables .......................................................................................... 54 5.2.1.	   Redistricting	  –	  significant	  redistricting	  or	  no	  change	  ..............................................	  54	  5.2.2.	   Constituent	  sorting	  –	  rural,	  white,	  black	  and	  Hispanic	  ...........................................	  56	  5.2.3.	   Economic	  explanation	  –	  Mean	  household	  income	  and	  poverty	  status	  ...............	  57	  5.2.4.	   Party	  activism	  –	  Tea	  party	  legislators	  ............................................................................	  58	  
5.3. Overview of variables ................................................................................................ 60 
	   vi	  
6. Analysis ............................................................................................................................ 61 
6.1. Polarization in the Texan congressional delegation ................................................... 61 
6.2. The constituency and legislators ideological score .................................................... 64 6.2.1.	   Treatment	  of	  data	  and	  problems	  encountered	  ..........................................................	  64	  6.2.2.	   Results	  from	  Model	  1	  and	  2.	  ...............................................................................................	  67	  6.2.3.	   Analysis	  of	  Model	  1	  ................................................................................................................	  70	  6.2.4.	   Analysis	  of	  Model	  2	  ................................................................................................................	  72	  6.2.5.	   Comparing	  results	  from	  Model	  1	  and	  2	  with	  theory,	  and	  answering	  the	  	  	   hypotheses	  .................................................................................................................................	  73	  
6.3. Summary of analysis .................................................................................................. 79 
 
7. Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 80 
7.1. Discussion of the results and research question ......................................................... 81 
7.2. Answering potential criticism and suggestions for future research ........................... 85 7.2.1.	   Answering	  potential	  criticism	  ...........................................................................................	  85	  7.2.2.	   Suggestions	  for	  future	  research	  .......................................................................................	  86	  
7.3. Contributions .............................................................................................................. 87 
 
8. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 88 
 
9. Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 89 
 
10. Appendix ........................................................................................................................ 95 
10.1. Congressional maps over Texas 1996 – present ........................................................ 95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   vii	  
List of figures  
2.1. Weisberg/Dalton´s dyadic correspondence model  ........................................................... 15 
 
3.1. Democratic and Republican legislators in the Texas Congressional Delegation .............. 34 
3.2. Party control in the Texas House of Representatives and Texas Senate 1979-2015  ....... 34 
3.3. Income inequality in the United States and Texas (1969-2013) ....................................... 38 
 
6.1. Mean Democratic and Republican DW-nominate score (1st dim.) (Texas compared to the  
       rest of the U.S. House of Representatives) ........................................................................ 62 
6.2. Tea Party-legislators compared to other Republicans in the Texas Congressional  
       delegation .......................................................................................................................... 77 
 
 
List of tables  
3.1. Texas compared to the United States (2014) ..................................................................... 31 
3.2. Number of legislators and population growth in Texas – 1970-2010 ............................... 33 
3.3. Overview of hypothesis in this thesis ................................................................................ 40 
 
5.1. Categorization of districts as significantly redrawn or no change .................................... 55 
5.2. List of Texas legislators affiliated with the Tea Party Movement and source .................. 59 
5.3. Number of Tea Party-legislators compared to other Republicans in the Congressional  
       Delegation of Texas, 106th - 113th Congress ..................................................................... 59 
5.4. Overview of dependent variable and independent variables ............................................. 60 
 
6.1. Comparison of VIF scores, Model 1 and Model 2 ............................................................ 65 
6.2. Model 1 – Three regressions models including all explanatory variables ........................ 67 
6.3. Model 2 – Three regression models (excluding poverty) .................................................. 68 
6.4. Mean household income sorted after Democratic or Republican legislator ..................... 76 
6.5. Answer to the hypotheses .................................................................................................. 78 
 
10.1. Congresses and Almanacs analyzed in this thesis ........................................................... 95 
 
	   1	  
1. Introduction  
1.1. Research Question 
 
“Don’t mess with Texas”. This famous slogan is one of the first signs travelers see when 
driving along the endless highways in the Lone Star State. This sign sends a signal to travelers 
that this nation-sized state has its own kind of patriotism and traditions. While the two major 
parties for decades were ideologically placed almost in the same car, Democrats and 
Republicans have since the 1980s, both in Texas and the United States as a whole, driven 
further apart on separate ideological highways. Scholars on the United States Congress have 
never before seen a more polarized climate in Washington (Barber and McCarty 2013, 
Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 2006, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006, Theriault 2008). 
But the scholars themselves are polarized and disagree in which factors actually explain 
polarization.  
 In this thesis some of the various explanations for party polarization in the United 
States Congress will be tested. Rather than focusing on the entire Congress, which is quite 
common in the American literature, I will restrict my analysis to the Congressional 
Delegation from Texas in the United States House of Representatives.  Texas, with over 25 
million inhabitants and covering an area of nearly 700000 km2, is the second largest state in 
the United States in population and area. It is one among four states that has previously been 
independent republics, and as a nation-sized state has created its own distinct political and 
social culture. Still demographically and historically Texas reflects some of the unique 
diversity that is found in the United States (Barone, McCutcheon and Trende 
2013:1559,1564).  
One of the tests in this thesis is whether the explanations that are given for the 
polarization at the national level may apply to Texas. Focusing on one large state makes it 
easier go in depth at every congressional district, and see if constituency changes affect the 
legislators’ ideological position.  
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The research question for this thesis is as follows:  
 
Has there been an increase in polarization between the Democratic and Republican members 
of the Congressional Delegation from Texas in the House of Representatives between the 
106th and 113th Congress? Does the congressional district have any affect on the legislators’ 
ideological position? And may theories of polarization on the federal level explain 
polarization within a state congressional delegation?  
 
1.2. Justification of the thesis  
In Designing Social Inquiry King, Keohane and Verba argue that: “a research project should 
pose a question that is “important” in the real world” (1994:15). Polarization in the United 
States Congress has become an increasingly important issue over the years. Every day one see 
examples of how far Democrats and Republicans have drifted apart, and how reluctant the 
two parties have become in cooperating over party lines. Therefore it is important that the 
growing polarization is addressed. Is the polarization real and does the scholarship manage to 
give good enough explanations, are questions that need to be reviewed.  
King et al. also claim “…a research project should make a specific contribution to an 
identifiable scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to construct verified 
scientific explanations of some aspect of the world” (1994:15).  
 Following the guidelines from King et al. it is a straightforward process in identifying 
the scholarship on party polarization. A challenge is managing to narrow it down to which 
parts of the scholarship that are the most relevant for answering the research question. This is 
addressed in chapter 2. An interesting finding is that in spite of the large scholarship, very few 
scholars have tried to explain polarization at the state level based on the explanations for the 
federal level. Linking the federal and state level is quite a new field of research (Shor and 
McCarty 2011). And few scholars have made a case study of the states congressional 
delegation in Congress. Therefore this thesis approaches some new terrain that has not been 
comprehensively addressed before, and may consequently provide new results.    
By focusing on Texas I will manage to get a more detailed background on every 
legislator and his/her congressional district, and also how both the legislator and his/her 
constituency have developed over time. If these results may be used and applied to all 
members of the House of Representatives is worth finding out.  
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1.3. Structure of the thesis  
In the following chapter I will provide the theoretical framework for this thesis. First, I will 
define and discuss the terms polarization, ideology, liberal and conservative. Then the vast 
scholarship on polarization will be analyzed. This is divided into two sub-chapters: External 
and Internal. These are terms that I have borrowed from Barber and McCarty and will be 
further explained in part 2.2 (Barber and McCarty 2013:23).   
In part 2.3 I will analyze the external explanations, which is first and foremost 
explanations that are linked to the changes outside of Congress. The following explanations 
that I have chosen to address in part 2.3 are redistricting, ideological realignment, constituent 
sorting, economic explanations and extremism of party activists.  
Part 2.4 will look closer at the Internal explanations, which explore the changes and 
reforms at the inside of the parties in Congress. Here I will briefly go through the 
transformation of both the Democratic and Republican parties in the 20th century, and some of 
the most essential reforms that have transformed Congress. In every explanation analyzed in 
chapter 2 I will look at both the arguments and the counter-arguments that are provided in the 
literature.  
Chapter 3 is divided into three parts. Part 3.1 will analyze how the different 
explanations in Chapter 2 fit into a Texan context. The structure will resemble Chapter 2, but 
will address the literature that focuses on Texas. After every sub-chapter a hypothesis will be 
generated.  This part also contains the argument for why Texas is chosen as the case in this 
thesis.  
In chapter 4 the data and method will be presented, where both the advantages and 
challenges will be discussed. The data used in this thesis is gathered from Voteview.com and 
the Almanac of American Politics. The method chosen is a Time-Series-Cross-Section 
analysis (TSCS).  
In chapter 5 the variables will be operationalized. The dependent variable and the 
independent variables will be thoroughly reviewed and discussed.  
In chapter 6 the results from the analysis will be presented. In part 6.1 I will address 
the first part of the research question. In part 6.2 the results from the TSCS-analysis will be 
presented, and the hypotheses generated in chapter 3 will be verified or rejected.  
In chapter 7 the results from chapter 6 will be more carefully reviewed. This will be 
done with the theoretical framework in mind. In this chapter the last part of the research 
question will be discussed. Implications and mandates for further research will also be 
addressed. The conclusion of this thesis will be stated in chapter 8.   
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2. Theoretical framework   
 
In this chapter I will first define polarization and other important conceptual terms based on 
literature from several scholars. In part 2.2 to 2.4 I will take a closer look at the 
comprehensive literature on party polarization in the United States Congress. The first parts of 
this chapter will based on the literature, discuss how scholars define polarization, and on what 
level it exists. I will also define ideology, liberal and conservative, which are key concepts 
that are often mentioned in this thesis.   
 
2.1. Definition of polarization  
Many of the terms that are used in this thesis, are wide and complex terms. To narrow it down 
and define and understand the terms in a relevant context, I will base my definitions of the 
terms on the comprehensive literature that exists on polarization.    
 Although today’s scholarship on both Congress and polarization is comprehensive, it 
is according to Jacobsen a quite new field of research (2013:ix). There are several classical 
works on Congress from the end of the 19th century until the mid 20th century, but the 
amazing amount of literature studying Congress, and especially party polarization in Congress 
is something that emerged first in the 1980s. An interesting finding is that the terms 
polarization and party polarization were something that hardly occurred in scholarship prior 
to the 1980s. This may be related to the fact that modern party polarization started in the 
1980s after a long period of cohesion within the Republican and Democratic parties. In the 
1980s political scientists developed new tools to analyze Congress, like the NOMINATE and 
DW-NOMINATE-scales. This was developed primarily by Poole and Rosenthal and uses the 
average mean of the legislators’ ideological position. It ranges from -1, which means the most 
liberal, to +1, which is the most conservative (Poole and Rosenthal 2007:15, Carroll, Lewis, 
Ro, Poole and Rosenthal 2009:262-263).  Shor and McCarty claim that the development of 
the DW-nominate and spatial model of roll call voting was essential in the study of Congress 
(2011:530). I will revisit the DW-nominate and others measures of polarization in chapter 5.  
The DW-nominate is a common reference when scholars define polarization. 
McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal define polarization in short as: “…a separation of politics into 
liberal and conservative camps” (2006:3). They further define polarization by how it is 
measured.  Poole and Rosenthal also define party polarization in methodological terms. Their 
definition is: “the parties have to be apart on policy issues and the party members must be 
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tightly clustered around the party mean” (2007:105). Theriault maintains that: “the term 
polarization refers to the divide between how the parties vote and not necessarily the 
substantive difference between the parties” (2008:35).  
 Another approach scholars have made in defining and analyzing polarization has been 
to look at the level of political conflict and level of party cohesion. In some cases they have 
contributed new terms, like for instance Layman, Carsey and Horowitz (2006) who have 
studied what they call conflict extension. Their definition of conflict extension is as follows: 
“Clear policy differences between the two parties are not new. What is new is that the parties´ 
elites, mass coalitions, and activist bases have become sharply divided along the lines of 
multiple policy dimensions…in short new partisan conflicts have not displaced old ones; 
party conflict has extended from older to never issues” (Layman et al. 2006:104).   
Based on the literature I will argue that the term polarization may be used at three 
different levels: elite, party and popular polarization. These levels are not mutually exclusive 
and have several overlapping aspects. The terms I use are in many cases replaced by other 
terms, which I will also address.   
 
2.1.1. Elite polarization 
Elite is, as many other terms in this thesis, a wide and complex term. There are several 
schools about elites and “power elites” which are most often oriented toward class structures 
in society (Domhoff 1967). In this thesis I will have a more practical approach to the term 
elite and use Levendusky’s definition where elites are understood as “partisan political elites 
[are the] politicians holding elected office who have some control over policy…[for instance] 
members of Congress, presidential nominees, governors and so forth” (Levendusky 2009:4) 
Theriault have identified at least three types of elites: “elected representatives, those engaged 
in multiple political activist and those attending their parties’ national nomination 
conventions” (Theriault 2008:111). These groups will be further examined in part 2.3.3.  
 Levendusky (2009) and several other scholars claim that since the 1970s the elected 
elites in Congress have sorted themselves towards the ideological poles, where liberal elites 
have become Democrats and conservative elites have become Republicans. This has clarified 
what the parties stand for and made it easier for voters to sort under a partisan label 
(Levendusky 2009:2-3). This argument will be revisited in part 2.5, and is also examined in 
part 2.3.3, 2.3.5 and 2.4.1.      
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2.1.2. Party polarization 
At this level it is first important to get an understanding of what a party is. O´Connor and 
Sabato define party as: “An organized effort by office holders, candidates, activists, and 
voters to pursue their common interests by gaining and exercising power through the electoral 
process” (2008:421). Lee claims that: “Parties are institutions with members who have 
common political interests in winning elections and wielding power, not just coalitions of 
individuals with similar ideological preferences” (2009:18). The classical definition of the 
term party has been disputed in recent literature. Masket defines parties rather as: “loose 
alliances of policy demanders…often operating at the local level, outside the legislature, who 
manipulate party nominations to control the government” (Masket 2009:53).  
 In the modern literature on party polarization, it is easy to assume that the definition of 
party, and how the parties operate, is inspired by V.O. Key’s classical work Politics, Parties 
and Pressure Groups (1942/1964). In his work Key claims that the party operates at least four 
different levels: 1) The party-in-the-electorate, 2) the professional political group, 3) the 
party-in-the-legislature and 4) the party-in-the-government (Key 1964:164).  Key´s 
comprehensive work is worth reading. Based on Key´s party levels O´Connor and Sabato 
(2008) have a provided a more modern account on how the party operates. O´Connor and 
Sabato maintain that the party consists of: “three separate but related entities”, which they call 
the governmental, organizational and party in the electorate (2008:422). The governmental 
party is the merging of Key´s “party-in-the-legislature” and “party-in-the-government”. The 
organizational party is the delegates to conventions and activists that make up the formal 
party structure. The party in the electorate is “the voters who consider themselves allied or 
associated with the party” (O´Connor and Sabato 2008:422). These different party levels will 
be revisited in part 2.3.3, 2.3.5 and 2.4.1.   
  It is first and foremost the “governmental party level” that is most often addressed in 
the literature on party polarization. Scholars have seen that the parties have become more 
cohesive since the 1970s, both in voting patterns and in ideological positions.   
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2.1.3. Popular polarization and sorting of voters  
Popular polarization is maybe the most disputed term among scholars in this field of research, 
and refers to the polarization that occurs on the electoral level. Here it is important to clarify, 
which Fiorina, Abrams and Pope do: “…it is crucial to understand that [the increasing 
polarization] is partisan polarization, not popular polarization” (2005:25). Partisan 
polarization (not to be misunderstood with party polarization) is that the electorate sort 
themselves after party identification. Popular polarization is on the other hand that they 
separate on ideological and political issues (Fiorina et al. 2005:25). This will be further 
addressed in part 2.3.3.  
 Levendusky (2009) argues that the term popular or partisan polarization is not 
preferable and rather calls it partisan sorting. Levendusky defines popular polarization as a 
phenomenon that occurs when the electorate moves to the ideological extremes and the 
ideological center disappear. What he rather emphasizes in his study is that the electorate has 
increasingly sorted themselves under the Republican or Democratic Party labels (Levendusky 
2009:3-7).  Another term used by Theriault (2008:44,58) is constituent sorting. These terms 
will be further examined in part 2.3.3.  
 
2.1.4. Definition of Ideology, Liberal and Conservative 
In this sub-chapter I will briefly discuss ideology, liberal and conservative. These are quite 
wide and complex terms that will often be addressed in this thesis, and may contain different 
meanings. I will not try to get lost in a deep philosophical debate, but base the terms in the 
context of the scholarship on American politics. In the literature itself ideology has been often 
defined on a liberal/conservative dimension, but there is a general lack of agreement of how 
to define the concepts ideology, liberal and conservative. Maybe it is because these terms 
often are taken for granted.   
 Some scholars like Lee (2009), Levendusky (2009) and O´Connor and Sabato (2008) 
have provided brief conceptual definitions and debate around these terms. O´Connor and 
Sabato have defined ideology as: “A set or system of beliefs that shapes the thinking of 
individual and how they view the world” (2008:772). Levendusky defines ideology as a: 
“…cluster of ideas encompassing not just a set of issue positions but also the connections 
between the issues themselves…and the connections between the issues and abstract concepts 
like liberalism and conservatism” (2009:4). Both Levendusky and Lee see challenges in 
defining ideology and practically define the term like most scholars do by basing it on a 
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liberal/conservative ideological dimension. This is often based on surveys (like for instance 
the National Elections Studies) where respondents place themselves on a variety of different 
issues (Levendusky 2009:4).     
 Scholars have seen that in current American politics there is a strong correlation 
between ideology and party preference, where liberal means Democrat and conservative 
means Republican (McCarty et al. 2006:chap. 1, Theriault 2008:48). To get the best 
understanding of the liberal/conservative dimension it is important to briefly define the terms  
“liberal” and “conservative”. In American politics one may place the terms liberal and 
conservative in two 1  broad dimensions (Poole and Rosenthal 2007:20-22). The first 
dimension is the economic dimension, which is most often regarded as the role of 
government, level of taxation and welfare. O´Connor and Sabato have defined a liberal as: 
“One considered to favor extensive governmental involvement in the economy and the 
provision of social services” (2008:773) and conservative as: “One thought to believe that a 
government is best that governs least and that big government can only infringe on individual, 
personal, and economic rights” (2008:770).  
 The second dimension is on a moral and faith issues. O´Connor and Sabato have 
further described a liberal as one whom: “…take an activist role in protecting the rights of 
women, the elderly, minorities, and the environment” (2008:773). The Democrats have for the 
last decades embraced policies like abortion and gay rights to marry, which is still strongly 
opposed among most conservatives (and within the Republican Party) (O´Connor and Sabato 
2008:421). How the Democratic and Republican parties have evolved into liberal and 
conservative parties will be briefly visited in part 2.4.1.       
An interesting finding is that the terms “ideology”, “liberal” and “conservative”, did 
not become important terms in labeling legislators until the 1960s. A study done by Lee finds 
that articles about Congress from early to mid 20th century very rarely used the term ideology, 
while over 80 percent of the articles published after year 2000 use ideology as an analytical 
concept (Lee 2009:30).  The scaling of ideology will be revisited in chapter 4.  
 
 
                                                
 
1 It is worth noting that several scholars operate with several other liberal/conservative dimensions, for instance 
foreign policy conservatism, and other terms of conservatism and liberalism, like neo-conservatism and neo-
liberalism. In this thesis I will address the socio- and economic liberal/conservative dimensions since these are 
the most commonly analyzed in the literature mentioned in chapter 2.   
2 The term “gerrymandering” is a combination of 19th century governor Elbridge Gerry´s name, who is first 
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2.2. Explanations for party polarization in the United States Congress – 
external and internal  
 
The scholarship on polarization in the United States Congress is comprehensive.  Although 
there is a general well-documented consensus among scholars that there has been an increase 
in party and elite polarization during the last thirty years, the various explanations for party 
polarization have been highly debated (Barber and McCarty 2013, Carson, Crespin, 
Finocchiearo and Rohde 2007:880, Jacobsen 2013, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006, 
Theriault 2008).   
Barber and McCarty have categorized them in two large categories: 1) external 
explanations and 2) internal explanations (2013:23). External explanations are most often 
linked to the changes outside Congress and usually explained by linking it to changes in the 
electorate. Scholars have often referred to external explanations as popular polarization or 
polarization in the electorate. I think it is more appropriate that explanations rooted outside 
Congress are called external since in some cases both the elites and the electorate may explain 
them. Internal explanations (also referred to as elite polarization) focus on the reforms inside 
of Congress (Carson et al. 2007:880, Theriault 2008:6).  
I will use the same categorization as Barber and McCarty (2013) to address the 
different explanations in the literature of party polarization in the United States. It is 
important to note that the categorizations “external” and “internal” are not mutually exclusive, 
for instance an external explanation may be linked to an internal explanation and vice versa.  
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2.3. External explanations 
There are several external explanations. In this part I will briefly analyze how the literature 
approaches some of the various external explanations.  
 
2.3.1. The Redistricting explanation 
Redistricting, often called gerrymandering2, is a popular explanation for the increased party 
polarization, especially for the House of Representatives. Scholars like Carson, Crespin, 
Finocchiearo and Rohde (2007), Hirsch (2003), Fiorina et al. (2005), Mann and Cain (ed.) 
(2005), Nelson (ed.) (2014) and Jacobsen (2013) emphasize the impact redistricting have had 
on polarization.  
In the debate about party polarization the proponents of this explanation maintain that 
parties deliberately create safe districts, where the party in fact doesn’t meet any real contest 
by the opposing party. This makes the electorate in redrawn districts more homogenous again 
dragging their representative in a more extreme direction. The result is that districts now send 
very conservative or very liberal legislators to Congress (Carson et al. 2007, Theriault 
2008:46).   
Redistricting is based on the events that occur in the aftermath of the census that is 
completed every decade in the United States. After the census the 435 members of the House 
of Representatives, the lower chamber of Congress, are required by the Constitution to 
reapportion the seats after changes in the states population. When a state gains or loses a 
membership in the House it needs to redraw its congressional districts. The 1962 Baker v. 
Carr Supreme Court decision gave the state partisan delegations the responsibility for drawing 
new congressional districts boundaries. These districts also needed to be population-equal. It 
was after this ruling that scholars first saw the link between the incumbency advantage, 
redistricting and party polarization (Carson et al. 2007:899, O´Connor and Sabato 2008:494-
495, Theriault 2008:63, United States Supreme Court Media 2014). Since the state partisan 
delegations are responsible of drawing lines, Carson et al. argue that the delegations use their 
                                                
 
2 The term “gerrymandering” is a combination of 19th century governor Elbridge Gerry´s name, who is first 
credited for politicizing the redistricting process, and a salamander, since the strangely shaped district Gerry 
created in 1812 resembled a salamander. O´Connor and Sabato has further defined gerrymandering as: “The 
legislative process through which the majority party in each statehouse tries to assure that the maximum number 
of representatives from its political party can be elected to Congress trough the redrawing of legislative districts 
(2008:494).      
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partisan bias to draw districts that gain their party an advantage. In addition Carson et al. 
claim that: “…by drawing congressional districts in creative ways, mapmakers can exploit the 
underlying polarization, which further contributes to polarized legislative behavior” 
(2007:883-884)   
 
The redistricting explanation seems convincing. The “incumbency protection plan”, which 
Carson et al. call redistricting, surely works. For the last decades over 90 percent of 
incumbent members of Congress have been reelected.  Another fact is that the Republican 
Party has gained a structural advantage in the House because of redistricting. For instance in 
the 2012 election the Democrats won the popular vote with 50.6, but only gained 46.2 percent 
of the seats in the House of representatives (Jacobsen in Nelson 2014:166, Hirsch 2003). In 
the last five of the six presidential elections the Democrats have won the majority of the 
presidential votes, but since 1994 Democrats only have had the majority in the House of 
Representatives from 2006 to 2010. Gary C. Jacobsen’s explanation for the Republican 
structural advantage in the House is that due to their voters being more effectively distributed 
among house districts and although; …“both parties used control of redistricting to improve 
their candidates’ prospects, but Republicans more so than Democrats, and Republicans also 
came out ahead in states where neither party had full control of the process” (Jacobsen 
2013:9-19, Chap. 6, The New York Times 2014a). Sam Hirsch claims that: “redistricting has 
helped to transform the U.S. House of Representatives into a body that will no longer 
accurately reflect majority will” (Hirsch 2003:179).        
 
However, the redistricting explanation has also met a lot of criticism. Some of its main critics 
are McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) and Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning (2006). 
First of all the redistricting-explanation lacks evidence for causing polarization. An obvious 
weakness is that redistricting cannot explain the increasing polarization in the Senate and in 
several states that never experienced redistricting. Since 1980 the Senate have experienced a 
similar amount of polarization as the House of Representatives, although the Senate elections 
always take place within the same borders (McCarty et al. 2006, Theriault 2008:48). This is 
counter-argued by Theriault (2008) and Carson et al. (2007), who maintain that the 
polarization from the House has “spilled over” to the Senate. I will revisit this argument in 
part 2.4.1.      
McCarty et al. (2006) argue that party polarization is rather caused by the reallocation 
of seats from Northern liberal states to the more conservative Southern states, than 
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redistricting itself. For the last thirty years the population in the Northern states has stagnated 
or decreased, while conservative states in the South3 have seen a great population increase. 
For instance in the last census held in 2012 a total of 12 seats were reapportioned, and eight of 
the ten states that lost seats were in the North, while Texas gained four and other southern 
states like Florida, Georgia and South Carolina gained four combined. For McCarthy et al. 
redistricting and apportionment are not more than: “…a symptom of our political maladies 
rather than their cause” (McCarty et al. 2006:59 United States Census Bureau 2010).  
In part 3.1.1 the redistricting explanation will be analyzed in a Texan context.  
 
2.3.2. Ideological realignment 
Why a reallocation of seats from northern to southern states may cause party polarization may 
be better explained by Ideological realignment theory rather than the redistricting 
explanation. Ideological Realignment (also called Southern Realignment) is another 
established theory to explain the modern American party system and also the polarization that 
has increased since the 1970s. Several scholars like for instance Sinclair (2006), and 
Stonecash (2014) point to American political history and the realignment in the South in the 
1960s as the central explanation for party polarization. Other scholars like Cunningham 
(2010) provide detailed explanations of how this realignment occurred.   
Since the end of Reconstruction era after the Civil War, the Democratic Party 
dominated the Southern states, virtually meeting no opposition from other parties. This 
changed in the 1960s and 70s, when the Southern voters moved away from the Democrats, 
and gradually made the South into a competitive two-party-system in Congressional elections, 
and a Republican stronghold in presidential elections. This shift resulted in a gradual 
replacement of moderate Democrats with increasingly conservative Republicans in Congress. 
From being two parties dancing “cheek to cheek” around the ideological middle, the Southern 
realignment established the Republican Party as the conservative party and the Democratic 
party as the liberal party. This long-term political realignment is for Stonecash (2014) a 
central explanation for why party polarization has increased. He argues: ”…today’s 
                                                
 
3 In this thesis I will use McCarthy´s et al. definition of The South, meaning that the South consists of states of 
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia (McCarthy et al. 2006:25,48). Maryland, West Virginia and Delaware 
are often recognized as being a part of the South. In this thesis these states will be regarded as a part of the 
Northeast.      
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polarization is the product of today’s issues and yesterday’s political realignment” (Stonecash 
2014, Barber and McCarty 2014:26, McCarty et al. 2006:44-54). 
Race is often regarded as the conventional explanation for the realignment, after the 
Democratic Party embraced the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, leading to progressive 
laws like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965. Cunningham argues 
that the Democratic parties dominance in the South were as much due to loyalty rather than 
ideology. When the Democratic Party at the national level embraced the Civil Rights 
Movement, combined with nominating the ultra-liberal George McGovern for president in 
1972, they became the clear liberal alternative, but at the same time they broke the bonds to 
the loyal conservative Southern Democrats (Cunningham 2010:134-141, Jacobsen 2013:272).   
 
McCarty et al. provide an alternative explanation for the Southern Realignment. They argue 
that economic growth and migration of middle- and upper class whites, which moved from 
the North to the South, are the reasons for the Southern Realignment. These new well of-
migrants lacked the old grudges to the Republican Party; making the high-income Southerners 
affiliated with the Republican Party while low income Southerners became Democrats 
(2006:46-50). I will revisit the relationship between income and party affiliation in part 2.3.4 
and 3.1.3.  
McCarthy et al. explanation may be compared to Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) 
ideological realignment explanation. Basing their research on the National Elections Studies 
from 1976-1994, their key argument is that there has been an “intergenerational shift” in the 
electorate, and that “…today's voters are considerably more Republican and less Democratic 
than were their parents”. In addition Abramowitz and Saunders maintain, “The largest 
intergenerational differences are found among those groups with conservative policy 
preferences” (1998:638). Abramowitz and Saunders argue that ideological realignment is not 
only a Southern phenomenon. They have extended the ideological realignment theory, and 
argue that there has been a secular realignment all over the United States. For Abramowitz 
and Saunders the realignment did not start with the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, but 
with “the Reagan Revolution” in the 1970s and 80s (1998:638).     
 
The Southern Realignment-theory has some shortcomings. Prior to the 1970s, the Republican 
Party had several liberal and moderate representatives in the Northern states. The vanishing of 
these liberal Republicans cannot be explained by the Southern ideological realignment theory 
(McCarty et al. 2006:50). For McCarty et al. the: “Southern realignment clearly changed the 
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dimensionality of political conflict, but is not at all clear how the change in dimensionality 
generated greater polarization” (2006:53). The ideological realignment in Texas will be 
analyzed in part 3.1.2.  
        
2.3.3. The constituent- and partisan sorting – the ideological self-sorting of 
voters 
During the last 30 years scholars have seen that several counties of the United States have 
become increasingly politically homogenous. An analysis by The New York Times, based on 
Dave Leip’s presidential atlas, shows that in the 1996 presidential election 38 percent of the 
counties were won by a margin of 10 percent or less. In 2012 the number of competitive 
counties had been reduced to 18 percent (Leip in The New York Times 2014a).    
 A recent example is from is the Milwaukee, the largest city in the swing-state 
Wisconsin, which Barack Obama won with a decisive 66.8 percent of the popular vote in the 
2012 presidential election. In some of the wards Obama won over 99 percent of the popular 
vote. Less than a 30-minute drive from Downtown Milwaukee lays Waukesha County where 
Mitt Romney won with a 30-percentage point margin. According to the Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel “Metro Milwaukee is almost all dark red or dark blue: only seven of its 90 
communities were decided by single digits in the 2012 presidential race” (Gilbert 2014a, The 
New York Times 2012).   
 The last three decades these counties have become darker blue and darker red. While 
Obama won Milwaukee County with over 170000 votes in 2012, Bill Clinton only won the 
same county with 84000 votes in 1992, and Jimmy Carter only won the County with 56000 
votes in 1980. The population has stayed roughly at 950000 in Milwaukee County in this 
period.  Although winning in a landslide election in 1980 Ronald Reagan only won Waukesha 
County with 37000 votes, while Mitt Romney won the same County with over 84000 votes in 
2012, although losing the presidential election. Waukesha´s population has increased from 
280000 to 389000 since 1980 (Gilbert 2014b).  
The story of the Counties of Milwaukee and Waukesha is not unique, and one may see 
the same trend all over the United States. The increase of politically homogenously liberal or 
conservative counties is by Theriault defined as constituent sorting. This an abbreviation of 
what Theriault calls: “the political and geographical sorting of constituents” (2008:44,58). 
The constituent sorting-explanation may look similar to the redistricting explanation, but 
where elites drawing homogenous districts explain the redistricting explanation, this 
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explanation looks at how the electorate has ideologically sorted themselves in increasingly 
conservative and liberal districts during the last decades. Unlike the redistricting explanation, 
the constituent sorting explanation may explain the increasing polarization in the Senate. 
Scholars like Abramowitz et al. (2006), Dalton (2008), Gimpel and Schukneckt (2004), and 
Levendusky (2009) emphasize the impact constituent sorting have had on party polarization. 
The most common argument is that that an increasingly homogenous district creates safer 
districts, which again increases the incumbency advantage. When the constituency becomes 
more ideologically conservative or liberal this will drag their legislator in a more ideological 
extreme direction.  
Scholars disagree what cause the increasingly ideological divide in the American 
population, or if the increasing ideological polarization occurs at all. Scholars like Theriault 
(2008) analyses the constituent-sorting explanation, but argues that the link between voter 
sorting and polarization is overemphasized. Fiorina et al. (2005), and DiMaggio, Bryson and 
Evans (1996) also dispute the constituent sorting explanation. I will revisit their counter-
arguments later.  
The link between the legislator and his/hers constituency is a classic subject in 
American political scholarship. One term developed by Robert Weisberg is dyadic 
correspondence, defined by Russell Dalton as; “the pairing of district opinion and elites…in 
simple terms, liberal districts presumably select liberal representatives, and conservative 
districts select conservative representatives” (Dalton 2008:223). The dyadic correspondence-
model argues that the constituency’s attitude affects the legislator´s attitude, again affecting 
the legislator’s roll-call votes. The constituency’s attitude also affects the legislator´s 
perception of the constituency’s attitude.  
 
Figure 2.1: Weisberg/Dalton´s dyadic-correspondence model  
      
                               Legislators/elite’s attitude                  
   A     B 
          
Constituency’s                   Legislator’s  
Attitude                   roll-call votes  
   C       D 
  Legislator’s perception of           
                     Constituency’s attitude  
     
Source: Dalton 2008:224  
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This part of Weisberg’s model will be revisited in part 2.3.5. Dalton shows us that in 
the 104th Congress there was a close linkage between the constituency’s conservatism and 
representatives issue position (Dalton 2008:225).  Weisberg’s dyadic correspondence-model 
is not commonly referred to in the literature of party polarization, but the link between the 
constituency ideology and the legislator’s ideology is a common explanation for the 
increasing party polarization in the United States Congress.  As mentioned in part 2.3.2 
Southern United States has seen an ideological realignment, where moderate Democrats have 
transformed to more conservative Republicans, but scholars and political pundits see this 
trend in the rest of the United States as well (Abramowitz et al. 2006).  
 
The constituent sorting explanation is heavily debated among scholars, for instance Barber 
and McCarty (2013:23). I will revisit this debate later on, but first introduce another term for 
the sorting of voters called partisan sorting. This term is used by for instance Levendusky 
(2009) and Barber and McCarty (2013:23). Partisan sorting is based on the increase in 
ideological divergence between the Democratic and Republican parties, and growing 
ideological coherence within the two parties. While there in the 1970s was a large base of 
liberal Republicans (nearly 13%) and conservative Democrats (nearly 25%), these voices 
have diminished in both parties. In 2004 only 6 percent of Republicans placed themselves as 
liberals, and only 12 percent of Democrats regarded themselves as conservatives. In the same 
period the number of conservatives in the Republican Party have increased from composing 
around 50 to over 70 percent, while the liberal base of the Democratic Party has increased 
from 31 to 50 percent (Theriault 2008:89-90).  In the same period the number of “consistently 
or mostly conservative”4 and “consistently or mostly liberal” in the American electorate have 
increased significantly. In addition the ideological distance between the voters registered as 
Democrats or Republicans have increased sharply. According to a recent report by the Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press (Pew) (2014) over 92 percent of Republicans are 
more conservative than the median Democrat, an increase from 70 percent in 1994. In 1994 
only 70 percent of Democrats were more liberal than the median Republican. In 2014 this 
number had increased to 94 percent (Pew 2014:20). Levendusky argues: “Party and ideology 
                                                
 
4 The Pew Research Center has created an Ideological Consistency Scale ranging on a left/right-dimension from 
“consistently liberal”, ”mostly liberal”, ”mixed”, ”mostly conservative” and ”consistently conservative”. The 
placement is based on a range of questions on the survey respondent’s political values. See Appendix A in Pew 
2014a:82 for full questionnaire  (Pew 2014:18,82-84).    
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today are much more tightly aligned than they were a generation ago, with liberals and 
conservatives better sorted into the Democratic and Republican parties” (2009:1).  
 
The constituent- and partisan sorting explanations have some interesting empirical 
enhancements. First of all, the Pew study finds a correlation between the respondents’ 
ideology and where they want to live; over 70 percent of consistently conservatives prefer to 
live in large houses in rural areas while over 77 percent of consistently liberals want to live in 
large cities with small houses and “walkable” communities. In contrast only 21 percent of 
consistently conservatives have the same urban preferences and only 22 percent of 
consistently liberals has the same rural preferences as their conservative counterparts.  This 
development has created what Pew calls “Ideological echo chambers” (2014:52,13,42,45). 
According to Theriault: “Scholars who have been studying demographic trends at a 
neighborhood level find that …more and more individuals are moving closer to their 
ideological soul mates” (2008:89).   
Another finding is that during the last 30 years the number of voters who hold mixed 
Republican or Democratic positions and ticket-splitting 5  in elections has reduced 
significantly. Until the end of the 1980s half of the electorate split their vote in congressional 
and presidential elections (Gilbert 2014c, Levendusky 2009). In 2004 that number was 
reduced to only 21 percent. And in the last decade it has decreased even further. Theriault 
argues: “As constituencies have become more ideologically homogeneous, they are also 
casting increasingly consistent ballots between presidential and congressional elections” 
(2008:95-99). Hetherington explain the decline of ticket-splitting in this way: “Polarization 
has not caused partisans to like their own party more, but has caused them to like the other 
party much less… the other party is simply not a viable option in the eyes of most partisans 
any longer” (Hetherington in Nelson 2013:61).   
As mentioned earlier what has caused the electorate to sort is a great source of debate. 
In part 2.3.2 the ideological realignment both in the North and the South of the United States 
was highlighted. This has also been seen as an explanation for constituent- and partisan 
sorting. Layman, Carsey and Horowitz (2006) argue that there has been a “conflict extension” 
over the political dimensions between the two parties. Based on a comprehensive analysis of 
                                                
 
5 Ticket-splitting (or split-ticket-voting) occurs when a person votes for different candidates from different 
parties in elections for multiple offices. For instance that he votes for the Democratic presidential nominee and 
for the Republican candidate for Senate in the same election cycle.    
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the National Elections Studies, Layman et al. argue that the Democratic and Republican 
parties have diverged sharply since the 1970s on several major economic and social issues. 
When it in the 1950´s and 1960´s was hard to tell the difference between Democrats and 
Republicans on several policy dimensions, conflict-extension has made it easier for the 
electorate to recognize their ideological preferences with the elites in the Democratic or 
Republican Party (Laymen et al. 2006:89-93).  Levendusky (2009) also argues that the 
partisan sorting of voters is elite driven; “As elites pull apart on to the ideological poles, they 
clarify what it means to be a Democrat or a Republican. Ordinary voters use these clearer 
cues to align their own partisanship and ideology (2009:3)”. Levendusky argues that voters 
may sort in two ways; either by shifting parties (for instance that a liberal Republican 
becomes a liberal Democrat) or by realigning their ideological beliefs with the mainstream of 
the party (for instance that a liberal Republican becomes a more conservative Republican).   
Levendusky’s arguments indirectly counter-argues Weisberg/Dalton´s dyadic-
correspondence model by reversing it. Instead of the electorate affecting the attitudes of their 
legislators it is rather the other way around. Levendusky acknowledges that the increase in 
constituent- and partisan sorting, with more ideological pure liberal and conservative districts, 
pressures the elites to maintain less centrist ideological attitudes. “So while sorting is elite 
driven, a better-sorted electorate also has important consequences for elite behavior” 
(Levendusky 2009:9).  
 
A question is whether constituent- and partisan sorting has led to popular polarization as 
well. A popular perception is that United States has become a divided 50-50 “red and blue” 
nation where “progressive liberals” and “orthodox conservatives” almost live “worlds apart” 
(Gilbert 2014a). Hunter (1991 in Layman et al. 2006) is often cited for what he called “The 
Culture War” between the “Red” and “Blue” America. Several Political pundits, some 
politicians and some scholars argue that the electorate has sorted to both sides of the 
ideological scale, with few voters remaining on the middle ground (Fiorina et al. 2005:1-4, 
Levendusky 2009). This is counter-argued by Fiorina et al. (2005) and DiMaggio et al. (1996) 
who argue that the broad majority of the American electorate, even comparing conservatives 
with liberals, shares many of the same ideological positions and has done so for several years.        
The constituent- and partisan sorting explanations also have some empirical caveats. 
Theriault tests the constituent-sorting explanation by comparing polarization scores of 
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legislators from “safe”6 states with “weak” states. According to the constituent- and partisan 
sorting hypothesis, and Weisberg’s dyadic-correspondence-model, legislators elected from 
“safe” and ideological pure districts should be more partisan and polarized than their 
colleagues elected from “weak” and ideologically mixed districts. Somewhat unexpectedly 
Theriault’s test shows that legislators from the “weak” states have experienced almost the 
same increase in polarization as legislators from “safe” states (2008:101-102, 104). 
Theriault’s test also proves that the members from “safe” districts had a more polarized 
starting point. Masket have a similar finding proving that members representing weak districts 
are almost as extreme ideologically as their fellow legislators elected from safe districts 
(Masket 2009:4-5).   
Constituent- and partisan sorting proves that elites from safe districts are slightly more 
polarized than their colleagues from weak states, and may therefore explain some of the 
increasing polarization in Congress during the last 30 years. But increasing party polarization 
is not just a safe district phenomenon. How the constituent sorting explanations suits in a 
Texan perspective will be analyzed in part 3.1.3.       
   
2.3.4. Economic explanations  
McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) claim that increasing income inequality and increase in 
immigration in the United States during the last thirty years are the main explanation for party 
polarization. Though income inequality increased significantly in the United States since 
1980, the linking between inequality and polarization is a very recent contribution to the 
scholarship on party polarization (McCarty et al. 2006:73).    
McCarty et al. see a close relationship between the Gini-index7, immigration8 and 
polarization. They argue: “inequality and polarization are linked by a dynamic relationship in 
which the increased inequality generated by rising top incomes produces electoral support for 
conservative economic policies and facilitates a movement to the right by Republicans”. This 
dynamic relationship, which McCarty et al. call a “Dance”, means that the polarization caused 
                                                
 
6 A “safe” state (or district) is regarded as a state/congressional district where the winning candidate won with 
over a 10-percentage point margin to his/hers closest competitor. A “weak” state (or district) is a state/ 
congressional district where the margin of winning was less than 10-percent (Theriault 2008).   
7 The Gini Index is a common measure for income inequality ranging from 0 to 1. 0 means perfect equality while 
1 is perfect inequality (United States Census Bureau 2014b:1).  
8 McCarty et al. uses the percentage of foreign-born residents in the United States to measure immigration 
(McCarty et al. 2006:9).  
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by rising inequality makes it harder to enact legislation that decreases inequality. With no 
policy response inequality continues to increase which again creates greater party polarization 
(Barber and McCarty 2013:30, McCarty et al. 2006). 
McCarty et al. argue that income has become one of the most important explanations 
for why voters sort: “High-Income voters increasingly identify with the Republican 
Party…[while] low income voters are increasingly in the Democratic camp” (McCarty et al. 
2006:71).  McCarty et al. used the average income of Democratic and Republican households 
to verify their hypothesis. Using data from 1973 to 2003 they proved that the average income 
difference between Democratic and Republican households had doubled from in a thirty-year 
period. In 2003 the average Republican household earned $49.355 while the average 
Democratic household income was $41.066, a gap of $8.289 (McCarty et al. 2006:48).  
 The link between income inequality and polarization has been criticized for being a 
spurious correlation, but a study by Garand: “Found strong evidence that state-level inequality 
exacerbates constituency polarization within states and predicts the extremity of Senate voting 
behavior” (Garand in Barber and McCarty 2013:30).   
 In part 3.1.4 the economical explanation will be applied for Texas.    
 
2.3.5. Extremism of party activists   
We have seen that both the redistricting and constituent sorting explanations argue that 
today’s legislators in Congress have safer, and less competitive congressional districts. But 
what is the link between safe districts and increasing party polarization?  
 The role of party activists is by several scholars seen as an important reason for the 
increasing party polarization (Layman et al. 2006:96-100, Masket 2009, Sinclair 2006:22-28, 
Skocpol and Williamson 2012, Theriault 2008:chap. 6). Party activists may be defined as 
different kind of groups within the party, for instance the elites (the elected representatives), 
the convention delegates, or the grassroots activists (often called partisans). These terms are 
often used interchangeably in the literature of party polarization (Theriault 2008:112). I will 
in this part focus on the convention delegates and grassroots activists, and I will use the Tea 
Party-movement as an example of grassroots activists.   
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 Scholars have for decades seen that delegates attending the Republican or Democratic 
national conventions9 are more ideologically conservative or liberal than the common party 
identifier. This trend has been occurring since the 1960s. Prior to the 1960s convention 
delegates (and party activists in general) were; ”professionals who sought victory at the polls. 
Issues and ideologies necessarily took a back seat to winning elections” (Theriault 2008:111).  
After the 1960s the convention delegates have gone from being party professionals to 
ideological “amateurs”, and have increasingly moved to the ideological poles on issues that 
separate the Republican and Democratic parties (Layman et al. 2006:97). Results from the 
Convention Delegates Studies and National Elections Studies shows that around 4 percent of 
Convention delegates regarded themselves as “extreme liberal” or “extreme conservative” in 
1972. While in 2000 this number had increased to 15 percent. In the public in general only 5 
percent regarded themselves as “extreme conservatives or liberals” (Theriault 2008:114-115, 
Layman et al. 2006:97).     
 The last group of activists is grassroots activists. One example I will use in this thesis 
is the Tea Party-movement 10 , which emerged in February 2009 just weeks after the 
inauguration of Barack Obama. From 2009-2012 Skocpol and Williamson made a 
comprehensive qualitative study of the Tea Party, and how they have become a massive force 
within the Republican Party. The Tea Party consists of all the groups of activists mentioned 
above; at elite level there is a large Tea Party-caucus in both chambers of Congress, as well as 
elected representatives in state level offices. These elites have received million-dollar 
donations from right-wing Foundations like FreedomWorks and Americans for Prosperity. 
The Tea Party also consists of a large group of grassroots activists that arrange rallies and 
meetings all over the United States (Berry, Portney and Joseph 2014:1,5, Skocpol and 
Williamson 2012:9,10,13). In this thesis I will call the grassroots activists associated with the 
Tea Party for Tea Partiers.  
The Tea Partiers are composed of a large majority of white, age 40+, middle class and 
evangelical Protestants, where men compose over 60% of the movement. This is also a very 
common social profile for a typical Republican. What distinguishes Tea Partiers is that they 
                                                
 
9 Prior to every presidential election, usually in August or September, the Republican and Democratic National 
Conventions are held (O´Connor and Sabato 2008:484-485).   
10 The Tea Party-term resembles the 18th century colonial protesters that rebelled against the British by tossing 
tea in the Boston harbor prior to the American Revolution, and started as a rallying term for the first protestors of 
the Obama Administration in 2009 (Skocpol and Williamson 2012:7). 
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are much more ideologically conservative than the median Republican, and are more angrily 
opposed to the Obama administration (Skocpol and Williamson 2012:26-27,30,42).    
The Tea Party may be regarded as the last element in creating a more conservative 
oriented Republican Party. Barbara Sinclair argues that since the 1970s a coalition of right-
wing intellectuals and evangelical leaders have built a “neo-conservative” infrastructure that 
has dragged the Republican Party to the right (Sinclair 2006:chap 2). Abramowitz also argues 
that the Tea Party is the latest (and loudest) addition to a long-term ideological shift within the 
Republican Party (Abramowitz 2011). Abramowitz connects this to the ideological 
realignment that has occurred in the electorate, which was reviewed in part 2.3.2.   
 
How does grassroots activist, like the Tea Partiers, drive polarization? The Pew Study (2014) 
finds that activists are less willing to compromise with the other party’s legislative agenda, 
and they are less willing to allow their elected representatives to make compromises as well. 
In addition activists are much more engaged in politics, and almost always vote in every 
election. The Pew Study also finds that over 70 percent of the politically engaged Republicans 
are “mostly” or “consistently” conservative, and also 70 percent of the politically engaged 
Democrats are “mostly” or “consistently liberal” (Pew 2014:25,56).   
Revisiting Weisberg’s dyadic-correspondence model, that I first introduced in part 
2.3.3 (see figure 2.1 as well) the “the legislator’s perception of the constituency attitude” had 
an important effect on the legislators’ roll-call votes (Dalton 2008:224). Hypothetically, since 
activists are more engaged in elections, the legislator may perceive that his/hers constituency 
is more conservative or liberal than it actually is, since the activists are best in making their 
voice get heard.  
 
Layman et al. (2006) see the new role activists have gained during the last decades as a key 
factor in explaining the increasing polarization in Congress. They argue that there are two key 
factors: one is that the activists hold more extreme ideological views. Activists are regarded 
by Layman et al. (and other scholars as well) as the “dynamic element” in the partisan 
process, and by holding more ideological views contribute to the “conflict extension” that has 
occurred the last decades (2006:96-100). Taking the Tea Party as an example of “conflict 
extension”, Skocpol and Williamson argue that the Tea Party has made a significant impact 
on the Republican Party, and has an ambition of remaking the Republican Party “into a much 
more uncompromising and ideologically principled force…[wanting] Republicans in offices 
to refuse compromises with the Democrats … [and] they “go nuclear” when GOP 
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officeholders take any steps toward moderation and negotiation” (2012:156). The Pew Study 
mentioned above shows that activists are more ideological, while Skocpol and Williamson´s 
study shows that the Tea Partiers are even more on the ideological fringe.  
The other factor Layman et al. emphasize is that activists play an important role in the 
nomination process. In the United States most party nominees are selected in primary 
elections11, in contrast to other democracies where nominees most often are selected by a 
small group of party elites. In the late 1960s several reforms were implemented that made the 
primary process in both congressional and presidential elections more open and participatory. 
Layman et al. argue that in the primary process: “…candidates need the support of party 
activists, who are disproportionately represented in these contests, to secure nominations. … 
Party nominees also need activists´ financial support and manpower in order to win general 
elections” (2006:96). Tea Partiers are a good example, by Skocpol and Williamson seen as 
“watchdogs” on the conservative fringe, Republicans legislators are in many ways pushed to 
the right. If they held too moderate stands it is likely that they will meet a Tea Party-backed 
challenger in the next primary. This is what happened in 2010, 2012 and 2014 when several 
established Republican legislators lost their seat to a Tea Party backed challenger. The biggest 
upset came in June 2014 when Eric Cantor, the majority leader 12  in the House of 
Representatives, lost his seat to a Tea Party-backed primary opponent (Berry et al. 2014:8, 
The New York Times 2014b, Skocpol and Williamson 2012:178-183). This may support 
Layman’s et al. primary explanation. 
 
The primary explanation, that Layman et al. argue is a driver for polarization, is a great source 
of debate. Kaufmann, Gimpel and Hoffman argue that in open primary elections nominees are 
less polarized, and in general hold more ideological views than the rest of the electorate. This 
is in contrast to closed primary elections, which is dominated by party activists, and the 
nominees are more polarized (Kaufmann et al. in Barber and McCarty 2013:29). McGhee, 
Masket, Shor, Rodgers and McCarty (2013), McCarty et al. (2006), and Barber and McCarty 
                                                
 
11 There are three ways primary elections may be held, and it´s up to the states themselves to decide. The oldest 
is that they are arranged as caucuses, where party delegates meet in small groups and decide. Another is a 
closed-primary, where only members of the party may vote. The third is open primaries, where everyone may 
vote (O´Connor and Sabato 2008:481-482).   
12 The Majority Leader is the elected leader of the party controlling the majority in the House of Representatives, 
and is the second-highest ranking member in the House, only surpassed by the Speaker of the House (O´Connor 
and Sabato 2008:773).   
  
	   24	  
(2013) see the primary explanation as “implausible as best” and argue that polarization has 
increased despite reforms opening up most primary elections. They further argue that open 
primaries did not create more moderate candidates, and have little effect on the legislators’ 
ideology (McGhee et al. 2013:347, Barber and McCarty 2013:29). Regardless of open or 
closed primaries the literature sees activists as an important explanation for the increasing 
polarization. One reason is the role that the legislators elected and endorsed by activists play 
in Congress. This I will examine in part 2.4.    
 
Finally in this sub-chapter I find it relevant to analyze party activism in the lens of May’s 
special law of curvilinear disparity. Often called for May’s law, this classical model explains 
ideological conflict within a party.  May divides the party into three categories: leaders, sub-
leaders, and non-leaders, who are hierarchically ranked after their status and powers.  May’s 
law claim that: “non-leaders usually take the most moderate line on any particular issue, sub-
leaders prove the most ideologically extreme, while top leaders are located equidistant 
between these echelons” (Norris 1995:30, May 1973:135-136).  
 The various explanations revised in part 2.3 and 2.4 may fit well into Mays theory. As 
mentioned in part 2.3.3 the American population (which here may be regarded as “non-
leaders”) has not polarized in the same degree as the Republican and Democratic parties, but 
they have sorted into the two political parties as they have become more ideologically 
distinct.  In part 2.3.5 we saw that activists, like the Tea Party-movement, are often the most 
ideologically extreme. This goes hand in hand with May’s law, which claim that it is the sub-
leaders who are the most ideologically extreme. An argument is that May’s law may be more 
appropriate in explaining the activist behavior within the Republican Party, which has seen 
the surge of the Tea Party-movement, but not for the Democratic Party, which has not seen a 
formation of a similar movement (May 1973:135-136, Norris 1995:30-31). Party Activism in 
Texas will be further analyzed in part 3.1.5.    
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2.4. Internal explanations  
We have seen that redistricting, the constituent and partisan sorting of voters fueled by 
increasing economic inequalities and partisan activists are key explanations for party 
polarization. But what factors drive polarization from the inside of Congress? The internal 
factors have become a major part of the recent literature. Even if the internal explanations will 
not play any major part in the rest of this thesis, I regard it as important to review these 
theories since they contribute in explaining the growing party polarization. Therefore in this 
chapter the internal explanations will be briefly reviewed. The chapter will end in a short 
discussion whether the external and internal explanations may be linked together.   
 
2.4.1. Revival of party cohesion and replacement of moderates in Congress  
In the period of 1950 to 1980 several transformations occurred inside Congress that according 
to scholars like Lee (2009), Jacobsen (2013), Sinclair (2006) and Theriault (2008, 2013) 
paved way for polarization and partisan warfare.  They argue that these transformations may 
be traced to several waves of elected representatives that changed the norms inside of 
Congress, at the same time as rule changes made this possible. I will here briefly address the 
transformations of the two parties. Since the transformation of the Democratic Party occurred 
previous to the Republican one, I will address their transformation first.     
 
Transformation of the Democratic Party 1960-1980  
In the mid-20th century the Democratic Party dominated congressional politics, having 
the majority in both chambers of Congress almost continuously from 1930 to 1994 (Sinclair 
2006:67). But the Democratic Party at that time was a large and fractious party with a large 
group of conservative Democrats from the South and liberal and moderates in the North. The 
ideological distance factions had a DW-nominate score of 0.4 in the 92nd congress. In the last 
thirty years the ideological distances has within the Democratic Party decreased to less than 
0.2. To form a majority the conservative Democrats often voted with the Republican Party 
(Sinclair 2006:70,73, Theriault 2013:20). Due to the ideological realignment the conservative 
Democrats gradually disappeared from the national scene. The same did the liberal 
Republicans. In part 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 I discussed the external factors that contributed to the 
vanishing of these groups. But two waves of new elected representatives, in each ideological 
camp, amplified this process, and transformed Congress from the inside from a “textbook 
Congress”, with fractious parties, to a “partisan Congress” with distinct and cohesive parties.   
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Sinclair argues that the first wave occurred in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal 
in 1974. The scandal, which brought down president Richard Nixon, tarnished American 
politics in general. In the following midterm elections the same year a large group, consisting 
of 75 progressive and young Democrats were elected.  Called the “Watergate babies” they 
according to Sinclair: “…had come into this hidebound institution and produced a revolution, 
suddenly and completely upending the old power structure” (2006:68).  With the Watergate 
babies rise to prominence they managed to implement several reforms that changed Congress, 
which I will discuss in part 2.4.3. They also transformed the Democratic Party to a more 
cohesive and liberal party (Sinclair 2006:74).    
 
Transformation of the Republican Party 1978-1994  
In the late 1970s several changes also occurred inside the Republican Party. With the 
Democrats having the majority in Congress for several decades, the Republicans were in the 
late 1970s regarded as a “permanent minority” in Congress.  For several Republican 
legislators the culture was to “go along to get along”, meaning that instead of being purists at 
the ideological fringe, they rather moved to the middle to make compromises with the 
Democrats (Sinclair 2006, Theriault 2013:25).   
 As mentioned briefly in part 2.3.5 a build up of a neo-conservative infrastructure in the 
late 1960s and 70s brought new and more conservative ideas into the Republican Party. The 
elections of 1976, 78 and 80 brought several of these new conservatives into Congress. One 
of them was Newt Gingrich, first elected to the House in 1978. Gingrich is often claimed as 
the architect of transforming the Republican Party from an ideologically indistinct party, that 
often made compromises with the Democrats, to a confrontational, distinct and cohesive 
conservative party (Sinclair 2006, Theriault 2013:25).   
  Through the Conservative Opportunity Society (COS), which Gingrich founded with 
other conservatives in the late 1970s he, according to Theriault: “…had an organization to 
help him criticize the Democratic leadership and bring down the 30-year Democratic majority 
that had persisted in the House” (Theriault 2013:22, Sinclair 2006:113). After slightly gaining 
more ground in several elections the Republican won the majority in both Houses of Congress 
in 1994, making Gingrich13 Speaker of the House.  
                                                
 
13 Gingrich ultimately had to resign both the speakership and seat in Congress after an ethic scandal in 1998. 
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Gingrich transferred the tactics he had used inside of Congress to the outside as well, 
engineering a more confrontational electoral strategy for Republicans seeking office. As a 
result of Gingrich confrontational strategy the DW-nominate scores for the Republican 
legislators have increased significantly since Gingrich entered the House in 1978 (Theriault 
2013:23-24,28).  He is also seen as key person in explaining the increased polarization in 
Congress. As mentioned in part 2.3.1. Theriault argues that the increased polarization in the 
House has “spilled” over to the Senate. In a comprehensive study of Gingrich and his 
colleagues, Theriault created a term called the “Gingrich Senators”. This is a group of 
Republican Senators that first served with Gingrich in the House before they became 
Senators. Theriault argues that the “Gingrich Senators” have had an important effect of 
creating a more partisan and polarized Senate (Theriault 2013).        
 
Strategic disagreement  
The more confrontational approach to policymaking that especially the Republican Party 
implemented in Congress are by many scholars called strategic disagreement or 
“teamsmanship” (Barber and McCarty 2013:35, Lee 2009).  Since the battle for the majority 
in Congress and in the presidential elections has become very competitive the last decades, 
the party often sees an electoral advantage in refusing to compromise with the other party, for 
then to blame the other party for the legislative gridlock in hope of gaining an electoral 
advantage in the next election. This may be strengthened by the fact that divided 
government14 has been the general trend since the 1970s. Jacobsen argues that: “…divided 
government helped to unify both parties in both houses” (2013:261), analyzing that the party 
unity vote increased significantly within both parties in the 1980s. Barber and McCarty claim 
that strategic disagreement: “…often results in the appearance of a level of polarization that 
exceeds the actual policy differences between the parties” (2013:35).   
  
 
 
 
                                                
 
14 Divided government occurs when different parties control the White House and Congress. Since 1968 divided 
government has occurred except for the periods of 1977-81, 1993-95, 2003-07 and 2009-11 (O´Connor and 
Sabato 2008:770).   
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Replacement of moderates  
One important factor that has contributed to both party cohesion and polarization in Congress 
is the replacement of moderates, which has escalated the last decade. As mentioned in part 
2.3.3 and 2.3.5 ideological moderates have vanished from both parties since the 1970s. In 
both the 2006 and 2008 elections several moderates retired from the House. In 2010 
moderates retired as well, but many of them lost their seat to Tea Party-candidates (also 
mentioned in part 2.3.5). In this election the amount of “blue dog” moderate democrats 
dropped from 54 to 27 and it further decreased to just 14 after the elections of 2012 (Nelson 
2014:163).   
With the 2014 elections just finished, where the Republican Party gained control of 
the Senate as well, political pundits see that the increasing number of very conservatives in 
both chambers of Congress may contribute to more polarization and increase the strains 
within the Republican Party (The New York Times 2014b).  
 
2.4.2. Institutional reforms  
The changes that have happened to Congress as a legislative institution since the 1970s are by 
many scholars, like Schickler, McGhee and Sides (2003), Sinclair (2006) and Theriault (2008, 
2013) seen as explanations for increasing polarization. In the 1970s several reforms where 
passed in Congress. The most notable were the seniority reform, the “sunshine reform”, and 
the committee reform (Schickler et al. 2003:301). The Seniority reform made it possible to 
elect committee leaders on other criteria than seniority. They also changed the elections of 
Committee Chairs from open to secret ballots.  The second reform was the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1970, which Schickler et al. call the “Sunshine reform” (2003:303). 
This reform changed the votes on floor amendments from being secret to being recorded. 
Moderations of the reform required that Committee meetings should be held in public. The 
third reform that Schickler et al. address is the several acts that reorganized the several 
Committees in both chambers of Congress (2003:304-305).       
 
All of the reforms of the 1970s era changed the old and quite hierarchical system of electing 
chairs and Committees, and increased the powers of more junior and activist members of 
Congress. The reforms opened up Congress, but also made it more exposed to public scrutiny. 
It also gave more power to junior, ideological and activist members. One of the most striking 
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examples happened in 1975 when three senior chairs where overthrown and replaced by 
junior committee members (Schickler et al. 2003:301-304, Sinclair 2006:73-80).   
The reforms changed the rules and procedures in Congress, and gave more powers to 
the leaders of Congress as well. When seniority became less important, the leadership elected 
the most loyal rather than senior members to become committee chairs. The leadership gained 
a powerful tool in threating members in denying them a chairmanship if they were disloyal to 
the party agenda. This is one of several “rewards and punishments” congressional leaders 
have to hold their fellow partisans in line. At the same time as leaders of Congress have 
gained more power, they have also become more polarized. Another reason for this is the 
growing divergence between the parties. Rohde and Aldrich claim that: “the leadership of 
political parties grows stronger when the parties become more internally homogeneous and 
externally heterogeneous” (Rohde and Aldrich in Theriault 2008:133).  
Theriault analyses the use of procedural votes and sees that the frequency of using 
procedural votes instead of substantive votes has changed dramatically since the 1970s. He 
maintains that: “as parties increasingly rely upon procedures, they are pushing themselves 
further apart above and beyond the substantive of their policy proposals” (Theriault 
2008:180).   
 
The theories mentioned in part 2.4 have been counter-argued by several scholars. Barber and 
McCarty regard internal changes as plausible, but see several methodological challenges in 
connecting both the reforms, rule changes and growing power of leaders (which they call 
“party pressures”) to polarization. Barber and McCarty regard it as: “unlikely that a one-time 
rules change would produce such a long-term trend”  (Barber and McCarty 2013:33-35). 
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2.5. The link between the external and internal explanations   
In this chapter I have briefly analyzed some of the most common explanations for the 
increasing polarization in American politics. We have seen that scholars disagree over what is 
the causal chain and which explanations actually account for polarization. Theriault argues 
that the biggest weaknesses with the external and internal explanations are that they “are 
independently incomplete” (2008:7). The picture becomes more complete when the various 
external and internal explanations are linked together. Sinclair maintains that: “external 
factors…made possible and were necessary condition for some of the internal 
changes…[but]…internal changes have shaped and amplified the effect of external factors 
and have had consequences of their own for how Congress makes law” (Sinclair 2006:66). 
Linking the external to internal changes is a challenging task, however several scholars are 
now focusing on this link. Another trend is that several scholars are now analyzing some of 
the consequences of party polarization (Theriault 2008: chap. 10).  
 As mentioned earlier the literature on party polarization is comprehensive. Several 
other scholars have provided different explanations for this phenomenon that is not mentioned 
in this thesis. For instance D’Antonio, Tuch and Baker (2013) see religion and the rise of the 
evangelical right as the main reason for party polarization. Others like Bickerstaff (2007) 
regard money as a central explanation. Race is often regarded as a key factor as well, which 
will be reviewed in chapter 3, but not as a separate theory.  The scholarship on party 
polarization is in rapid development, and to embrace all the different aspects of the literature 
is an almost impossible task.    
 The reason why I preferred to analyze the redistricting, ideological realignment, 
constituent sorting, economic and party activism explanations were that they are the most 
common explanations found in the literature. They may still be regarded as relevant, and 
stand the test of time for decades to come. In addition I also found it relevant to briefly review 
the most central internal explanations.  
In the next chapter I will look closer at the state of Texas. I will use the external 
explanations mentioned in this chapter and see if they may be applied to the Texas 
Congressional Delegation and their electoral districts.   
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3. Selection of case and how the theoretical framework applies to 
Texas 
3.1. Selection of case – Texas 
Due to the limitations of this thesis I have chosen to only analyze the congressional delegation 
from Texas in the House of Representatives (CDT). This is to get the best in-depth analysis of 
the external explanations that were summarized in chapter two. What will be analyzed are the 
CDTs congressional districts from the 97th to the 112th Congress.    
 
Table 3.1: Texas compared to the United States (2014)   
Source: Barone et al. 2013:5,1564, United States Census Bureau 2014b   
 
As seen in table 3.1, Texas has almost the identical demographical composition and economic 
distribution as the rest of the United States. One might see that there is quite a larger group of 
Hispanic ethnicity in Texas (38%) compared to the Nation as a whole (16,7%), that Texas has 
experienced a larger population growth, and that Mitt Romney performed 10 percentage 
points better in this State in the 2012 presidential election.    
Texas has often been characterized as an overwhelmingly conservative state, but this 
has been counter-argued by Anderson, Murray and Farley (1990: chap. 2). In spite of the 
                                                
 
15 Barones et al.’s data is based on the 2010 United States Census Bureau. The racial group ”other” in this thesis 
also includes Hawaiian.  Hispanic/Latino is classified as an ethnicity rather than race (Barone et al. 2013:17).    
 United States Texas  
Population: 305,745,538 
(9,7% increase since 2000) 
25,145,561 
(20,6% increase since 2000)  
Population per square mile:  88 96 
Urban/Rural: 80,9% - Urban 
19,1% - Rural 
84,7% - Urban 
15,3% - Rural  
Mean household income: 50,502$ 49,392$ 
Gini-Index: 0,481 0,481 
Race:  74,1% - White 
12,6% - Black 
4,8%  - Asian  
0,8% - Native American  
4,9%  - Other15 
2,8% - Two or more races  
74,6% white,  
11,7% black,  
3,9% Asian,  
0,5% Native American 
7,0% Other  
2,3% - Two or more races 
Hispanic/Latino ethnicity: 16,7% 38% 
Percentage of the 2012 
Presidential Vote: 
Barack Obama (D): 51%  
Mitt Romney (R): 47% 
Barack Obama (D): 41%   
Mitt Romney (R): 57% 
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common assumption of overwhelming conservatism, Texas has a history that makes it 
possible to apply and test the theories explained in chapter 2. This will be further analyzed in 
the following sub-chapters, were the different external explanations mentioned in Chapter 2 
will be fitted into a Texan context. First I will summarize some of the major redistricting 
events that have occurred in Texas. Then I will look at how ideological realignment, 
constituent sorting, party activism and eventually other factors fit into a Texan context. After 
every sub-chapter one or more hypotheses will be generated. The hypothesis will be tested in 
chapter 6.    
Whether or not Texas is more polarized than the rest of the United States will also be 
tested in section 6.1.  In the end chapter 4 I will have brief debate if it may be called a case 
study or not and other methodological choices.    
 
3.1.1. Redistricting of the congressional districts in Texas 
 
Since the Second World War Texas has experienced an enormous population growth. From a 
population of only 4.6 million in the 1940s, Texas’ population has increased to over 25 
million in 2010 (see table 3.1). In 1994 Texas surpassed New York to become the second 
most populous state after California, and became the second largest state delegation in the 
House as well (Barone, McCutcheon and Trende 2013:1559, Bickerstaff 2007, Anderson, 
Murray and Farley 1989). Due to the population increase, Texas has gained several 
congressional seats, which again has produced several rounds of redistricting. Therefore the 
redistricting explanation (mentioned in part 2.3.1.) may be applied.   
 It is the Texas State Legislature that is responsible for drawing the Congressional 
districts. The party that has held the majority in the State Legislature, which for most of the 
last century was dominated by the Democratic Party, has at times managed to draw quite 
biased redistricting plans. In the aftermath of the 1990 census the Democratic legislators 
managed to create a redistricting plan called both “the shrewdest gerrymander of the 1990s” 
and the Democratic “masterpiece”. For instance the 1991 redistricting plan gave the 
Democrats the majority in congressional seats although they didn’t manage to get the majority 
of the popular vote  (Bickerstaff 2007:29, Barone et al. 2009:1407).  
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Table 3.2: Number of legislators and population growth in Texas – 1970-2010. 
Year  Legislators/Congressional districts Population 
1970 24  11.196.730 
1980 27 14.228.000 
1990 30 16.986.510 
2000 32 20.851.820 
2010 36 25.145.561 
 
 
In 2002 the Democrats lost control of both chambers in the Texas State Legislature (as 
shown in figure 3.2). The new Republican majority did not hesitate in creating a new 
redistricting plan. In the following year one of the most controversial special redistricting 
plans in United States history was passed. After the 2003 redistricting the congressional 
delegation (as seen in figure 3.2) went from a 17-15 Democratic majority in the 108th to a 21-
11 Republican majority in the 109th Congress, giving Texas the largest Republican delegation 
from any state. According to Bickerstaff: “The 2003 redistricting plan was designed to 
provide noncompetitive congressional districts” (2007:3-6). The plan intended to marginalize 
the Democratic Party as well, targeting specifically white democratic legislators (Barone et al. 
2005:1576, 2013:1407).  The plan succeeded and as seen in figure 3.1 below the Republicans 
gained several legislators after the 108th Congress.  
The test in this case if is the several rounds of redistricting since 1980 have caused a 
more polarized delegation from Texas. Here I will use the theoretical framework to Carson et 
al. first mentioned in part 2.3.1. Based on Carson´s et al. theory and methodological 
framework my hypothesis is as follows:   
 
H1: Legislators from redistricted districts in Texas are more ideologically conservative in the 
United States House of Representatives     
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Census 1970-2010, Barone et al. 2013 
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Figure 3.1: Democratic and Republican legislators in the Texas 
Congressional Delegation 97th to 114th Congress  
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Figure 3.2: Party control in the Texas House of Representatives and 
Texas Senate 1979-2015 
Source: Anderson et al. 1989:119, Poole 2014 
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3.1.2. Ideological realignment in Texas 
Texas was, like most other southern states, for over a century a de facto one-party state 
dominated by the Democratic Party. In spite of only having one electorally successful party 
for nearly a century, the Democratic Party consisted of large conservative and liberal factions.  
 In the late 1960s and throughout 1970s the Democrats grip on the Lone Star State 
started to loosen. Shifts both within-state and at the national level paved way for a 
competitive, and later on dominant, Republican Party.  According to Abramowitz and 
Saunders (1998) and Cunningham (2010) the massive immigration to Texas was an important 
reason for the ideological realignment. As mentioned briefly in part 2.3.2 most of the 
immigrants where white conservative voters and didn’t have the old grudges to the GOP16 
(Abramowitz and Saunders 1998:638, Cunningham 2010:80).        
 In addition what Cunningham has called “the nationalization of state political culture” 
gave several new challenges to the Texas Democratic Party (2010:194). The 1972 presidential 
election was for many a major turning point when the Democratic Party nominated the 
George McGovern for president. McGovern’s nomination, which candidacy was labeled as 
one of “acid, amnesty and abortion”, was the last straw for many conservative Texan 
Democrats that could not bear the ultraliberal policies of the Democratic presidential nominee 
(Cunningham 2010:138-139).  
 The Democratic presidential nominee of 1976 Jimmy Carter managed to win Texas, 
but Democrats ultimately lost the grip of the Lone Star State. As late as 1978 “…twice as 
many Texans still identified themselves as Democrat than Republicans. Yet, twice as many 
Texans identified themselves as conservative rather than liberal” (Cunningham 2010:193). 
Carter’s unpopular presidency combined with the rise of Ronald Reagan as a conservative 
icon made several conservative Democrats realign with the Republican Party. Reagan, who 
himself formerly been a Democrat, “more than any other political figure in the state, tore 
down the barriers of loyalty and tradition that had kept many Texans voting Democrat for so 
long” (Cunningham 2010:223). Reagan ultimately defeated Carter with landslide margins in 
both Texas and the rest of the United States in the 1980 presidential election.  
 Since the mid-1990s the Republicans has dominated in statewide elections 17 . 
Democrats have not carried Texas in a presidential competition since Carter’s slim victory in 
                                                
 
16 The GOP stands for ”The Grand Old Party” and is a common nickname for the Republican Party (O´Connor 
and Sabato 2008).   
17A statewide election is the election of governor, lieutenant governor, senator or president.   
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1976, and not won any statewide election since 1994. The Democrats managed to hold the 
majority in the Congressional Delegation until the 108th Congress, due to the Democrats had a 
structural advantage until 2003. After 2003 the Republicans have had a clear majority in the 
Texan Congressional Delegation (see figure 3.1) (Barone et al. 2013:1559-1569).  
 According to Cunningham “The roots of national conservative Republican growth 
between 1980 and 2004 were located deep in the heart of Texas” (2010:241). To test the 
ideological realignment-theory I will see whether the Republican and Democratic legislators 
have become more cohesive. As seen in the literature the major realignment occurred when 
the traditional conservative Democrats shifted parties and became Republicans. Therefore it is 
not unthinkable that the Democratic Texan delegation has become more liberal since the 
1980s, and that the Republican more cohesively conservative. This will be done analyzed in 
section 6.1.  
3.1.3. Constituent and partisan sorting in Texas 
Texas is a large state with enormous rural areas, but the Lone Star State is also home to large 
cities like Houston, Dallas and San Antonio. According to Barone et al. Texas may be divided 
into four large regions for electoral analysis: “The Dallas-Forth Worth Metroplex, The Metro 
Parts of Houston, the more Democratic parts of the state (metro Austin, metro San Antonio, 
Rio Grande Valley), and the remainder rural and small town Texas, east, north, south and 
west” (Barone et al. 2013:1563-1564).     
 In part 2.3.3 I analyzed several various explanations for constituent sorting. One of the 
findings, based on the Pew study, was that voters living in rural areas tended to be more 
conservative that voters in urban areas (Pew 2014:13,42-52). Another theory mentioned in 
part 2.3.3 was Dalton/Weisberg’s dyadic-correspondence model that argued that the 
constituency´s ideology affected the legislator’s attitude, ideology and roll call votes. 
Dalton/Weisberg’s theory is indirectly counter-argued by Levendusky who maintain that it is 
the legislators who affect the constituency’s ideology. Since the legislators in Washington 
have drifted to the ideological poles it is easier for the common voter to see which legislator 
who are closest to their own ideological beliefs (Levendusky 2009:chap. 1).    
 In this test I will try to find out if there is a link between the percentages of rural 
population and the conservativeness of the districts legislator.  
 
H2: Legislators from rural districts are more conservative than legislators from urban 
districts in Texas.   
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3.1.4. Income inequality in Texas 
“Without the underpinnings and burdens of tradition, 20th century Texas produced fabulous 
wealth, generously rewarding success while being unforgiving of failure” (Barone et al. 
2013:1559). With Barone et al.’s citation in mind it is not surprising that political pundits and 
scholars have regarded Texas as one of the states with the highest income inequality of 
household income in the United States (Schnurman 2014).  
A combination of rapid immigration, great economic growth and in general policies 
that has not dealt with income redistribution has been regarded as some of the explanations 
for the rising income inequality in Texas as well as the United States.  The explanations for 
what causes income inequality is not central part of this thesis, but mentioned in part 2.3.4 
McCarty et al. argue that there is a link between income inequality and polarization (2006).  
McCarty et al. does this by linking polarization scores to the Gini-index. In addition McCarty 
et al. use the mean household income and compare it with party identification. Their finding 
is that Republican household has an average higher mean household income than Democratic 
households, and that the difference between Republican and Democratic household income 
has nearly doubled from $4,525 in the 93rd Congress to $8,288 in the 108th Congress 
(McCarty et al. 2006:6,48).  
In figure 3.3 we see that both the United States and Texas has seen a significant 
increase in income inequality since 1979. The increase in Texas was slightly higher than in 
the rest of the United States from 1979 until 1999. In the first decade of this millennium 
income inequality has continued to increase, but the rest of the United States has equaled 
Texas, both having a Gini-index of 0,48 (United States Census Bureau 2010b, 2014b). This 
means that the income inequality in both Texas and the United States is quite high compared 
with other western countries, for instance most western European countries has had a Gini 
Index ranging from around 0,25 to 0,37 (Smeeding 2005:958).  
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The Census Bureau has also collected household income data at the county level. An 
interesting finding is that some of the most economically unequal counties in 
disproportionally located in The South. Another finding is that Texas is home to both 
Edwards County, who has the second highest Gini-score in the US with 0.626, and Loving 
County with the lowest Gini-score with 0.207 (United States Census Bureau 2012:1,4).  This 
proves something of the diversity within Texas.  
 A data that is more easily collectible is the mean household income from every 
congressional district. This is for instance given in the Almanac of American Politics, and will 
be examined in part 4.2.3 (Barone et al. 1972-2014). The hypotheses generated are as follows:   
 
H3: The higher the mean household income of a district, the more conservative the legislator 
is.   
 
H4: The higher the poverty rate, the more liberal the representative from the district is. 
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3.1.5. Party activism in Texas 
Party activism has for most of the 20th century played a different role in Texas than on the 
national scene. Being a de-facto one-party state (also mentioned in part 3.1.2) most of the 
activism was not party labeled, but ideologically labeled with the struggles under the large 
Democratic umbrella. According to Anderson et al. (1989) the Texan Democratic Party 
consisted of a large conservative and liberal wing. The conservative faction of the Democratic 
Party was the most successful, since they contributed the most to the low levels of political 
participation and that conservatives voted in higher numbers than liberals. During the one-
party regime winning the Democratic Primary most often was equivalent to with winning the 
election (Anderson et al. 1989:57-61).  
 The establishment of a two-party regime in Texas in the 1970s and 80s and the rise of 
Ronald Reagan as a conservative icon and presidential candidate created more party activism 
in Texas. Reagan’s presidential campaigns of 1980 and 1984 mobilized more grassroots 
support in Texas than ever seen before. George W. Bush rise to both the Texas governorship 
in 1994 and Presidency in 2000 played on the same conservative strings as Reagan´s success 
in the 1980s (Cunningham 2010:159-236).  
 In the last years The Tea Party Movement, which I analyzed in part 2.3.5, has become 
a major factor within Texas. The victory of Ted Cruz in the 2012 Texan Senate election was 
for many seen as the “affirmation of the Tea Party Movement’s power”. With far less 
campaign funds, but with the backing of the tea party activists, Cruz managed in an upset 
primary to win over the Republican establishment candidate. Cruz is the latest example of 
legislators that have won because of strong Tea Party support (Barone et al. 2013:1576).  
With as many as 13 Texan legislators supported or affiliated with the Tea Party (from 
now on called Tea Party-Legislators), Texas has by far the largest portion of the Tea Party 
Caucus in the House of Representatives (Barone et al. 2013, The Atlantic 2010, Fox News 
Insider 2011, The New York Times 2010). Most of the legislators affiliated with the Tea 
Party today had been long time members when the Tea Party was formally established in 
2009. An interesting test is to see whether the Tea-Party Legislators has traditionally been 
more conservative than their republican co-legislators. It is also worth testing if the 
Congressional Districts to the Tea Party Legislators are more ideologically extreme. How this 
test will be conducted will be presented in part 5.2.4 and 6.2.  
 
H5: Tea-Party-Legislators are more, and have traditionally been more, ideologically 
conservative. 
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3.1.6. Other factors 
There may of course be several other factors contributing to the polarization within the Texas 
Congressional Delegation, which may also have an impact on the legislator’s ideological 
score.   Things that may need to be controlled for are the gender and the ethnicity of the 
legislator. Another factor that is hard to control but may of course have impact is the 
legislator’s personality.  
In addition Texas has also been home to two of the presidents during the timespan of 
this thesis: George H.W. Bush (1989-1993) and George W. Bush (2001-2009). Both were 
Republicans and it might be interesting to see if the Republican base is more strongly 
coherent and “rally” to support their presidents, who are both a fellow partisan and Texan.   
 
3.2. Overview of hypotheses 
 
In table 3.3 is an overview of the hypotheses mentioned in this chapter.  
 
Table 3.3: Overview of hypotheses in this thesis  
Nr.  Hypotheses Counter-hypotheses Theoretical 
explanation 
H1 Legislators from redistricted 
districts in Texas are more 
ideologically conservative in the 
United States House of 
Representatives.  
Legislators from redistricted 
districts are not more 
ideologically conservative.   
Redistricting  
H2 Legislators from rural districts 
are more conservative than 
legislators from urban districts 
in Texas.   
Legislators from rural districts 
are not more conservative than 
legislators from urban districts 
in Texas.   
Constituent sorting 
H3 The higher the mean household 
income of a district, the more 
conservative the legislator is.   
 
The constituencies mean 
household has no effect on the 
legislators’ ideological position.  
Economic explanation 
H4 The higher the poverty rate, the 
more liberal the representative 
from the district is.  
The poverty rate has no effect 
on the legislator’s ideology.   
Economic explanation 
H5 Tea-Party-Legislators are more, 
and have traditionally been 
more, ideologically 
conservative.  
Tea-Party Legislators are not 
more ideologically conservative.  
Party activism  
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4. Data and method  
4.1. Brief overview of methodological approaches and data used in the 
literature 
 
There are dozens of methodological approaches in the constantly growing literature on party 
polarization where both qualitative and quantitative methods have been frequently used. 
Masket (2009) and Skocpol and Williamson (2012) made qualitative interviews with 
respectively party organizers and Tea Party supporters. Several scholars like for instance 
Cunningham (2010) and Sinclair (2006) had a historically oriented methodological approach.  
 Still the vast majority of research done on party polarization has had a quantitative 
approach. This is due to several reasons. Data on Congress has always been quite easily 
available, and legislator’s votes have been recorded since the first sessions ever held in both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate. One might say the same about Census data, 
which has been gathered since the early days of the United States. In addition several interest 
groups have since the mid-20th century rated legislators (Barone and Ujifusa 1999:16-17).  
The work done the last four decades by Poole and Rosenthal with others (2007) with 
the development of the Nominate-scale, and gathering of data on every Congress, has been a 
major contribution for this research field. It may also explain why much of the literature uses 
various quantitative approaches. Most of the literature uses a cross-sectional or time-series 
approach or a combination of both. Both Theriault and McCarty et al. for instance make 
cross-sectional comparisons of the 93rd Congress with the 108th Congress as well as looking at 
how polarization has developed over time (Theruailt 2008:18,22, McCarty et al 2006:48).  
The reason why most scholars have the opportunity to use both cross-sectional and 
time-series is that they use the datasets provided from voteview.com where both roll call 
votes and legislator estimates have been collected for every Congress. This gives researchers 
the possibility to check how Congress has developed over time as well as making cross-
sectional analysis for every session in Congress.   
The Nominate-scale and data will be reviewed in chapter 4 and 5.      
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4.2. A case study or not 
It is worth discussing if this thesis may be called a case study or not. Gerring argues:  “There 
are two ways to learn how to build a house. One might study the construction of many houses 
… or one might study the construction of a particular house”. This citation from Gerring 
(2007:1) says something about the methodological approaches one might take. In this thesis if 
we regard the 50 state delegations in the United States Congress as “many houses”, Texas is 
then one, but a very large “house”. First of all, Gerring has defined a case study as an: 
“…intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is … to shed light on a 
larger class of cases (a population)” (2007:20). He further adds that case studies may 
incorporate multiple case studies, which he defines as case study research. However he 
maintains that: “At the point where the emphasis of a study shifts from the individual case to 
a sample of cases, we shall say that a study is cross-case. Evidently, the distinction between 
case study and cross-case study is a matter of degree” (Gerring 2007:20). It is most common 
to regard a case study as a typical qualitative method, but his claim is that a case study may be 
conducted by using both quantitative and qualitative methods (2007:10,33).  
One might maintain that this thesis may be called a “case-study”, since it focuses on 
just one case, which is Texas, and that this is limited in time (1981-2013). It’s though worth 
noticing that I use this case to test explanations made in a larger context.  There are several 
other cases that could be selected, like for instance other large states like California, New 
York or Florida. But due to the limitations of this thesis I maintain that it is better to go more 
in depth on the congressional districts of one state rather than several.  
Still this thesis does not have a qualitative design. In the following chapters the 
selection of data and method will be explained.  
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4.3. Selection of data 
 
Polarization in Congress is a field of constant research with large amounts of data available.   
A data source that is commonly used by scholars is the several datasets provided by Poole et 
al.18 at www.voteview.com19. This data is easily accessible and is based on the principle of 
open access.  There are two datasets I have downloaded and used from this blog. In part 4.3.1 
and 4.3.2 I will briefly go through some of their characteristics. In addition the reference work 
The Almanac of American Politics by Barone et al. (1971-2013) has been an important data 
source. This will be reviewed in part 4.3.3.  
 
4.3.1. Legislator estimates from the 1st to the 113th United States Congress 
The dataset “Legislator Estimates 1st to 113th Congress”20 comprehends every legislator that 
has served in the House of Representatives from the very first in 1789-1791 to the 113th that 
lasted from 2013-2015 (Carroll, Lewis, Lo, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2015). Based on 
roll call votes they have estimated all the legislators’ ideological position. This estimation is 
called the DW-nominate and will be further described in section 5.1. The dataset contains 
sorting variables like the legislators’ state, party and congressional districts, and therefore 
makes it quite easy to limit in time and space21. Of course analyzing all the legislators from 
the days of George Washington too Barack Obama is a to extensive task for this thesis. 
Therefore I have limited the dataset to the legislators from Texas that has served from the 97th 
to 113th House of Representatives.  
Yet another reason for selecting this dataset is that it is commonly used in the 
literature, and several of the scholars mentioned in chapter 2, like Theriault (2008,2013), 
McCarty et al. (2006), Poole and Rosenthal (2007), have used previous editions of this dataset 
as their empirical foundation.  
                                                
 
18 The data gathered from Voteview.com, described in section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, is publicly available and free of 
charge.  
19 The website Voteview.com was unfortunately hacked in late March 2015. The authors of the website are 
working on re-launching the website. Due to this attack, many of the original Internet links in this thesis does not 
work properly.     
20 For the larger part during the writing of this thesis I used The Legislator Estimates 1st to 112th Congress, which 
was the previous edition of this dataset. The dataset used in this thesis was introduced March 10th 2015 and may 
be downloaded here: ftp://voteview.com/junkord/HL01113D21_PRES_12.DTA  (Stata-file). It corresponds with 
the previous release of the dataset (Carroll et al. 2015). 
21 See Carroll et al. 2015 for a more detailed description of the Legislators dataset and the variables that are 
originally included.  
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4.3.2. Legislator estimates in the Texas State Legislature from 1973-2009 
In addition to the dataset mentioned in part 3.3.1, a dataset of legislator estimates in the Texas 
House of Representatives22 is downloaded (Poole 2014).  This is mainly to help sort and 
provide more information about the legislators from Texas. This data set is also created by 
Poole et al. and is accessible at Voteview.com. The dataset has ideologically mapped every 
legislator in the Texas House of Representatives from 1973-2011, based on the same 
principles as the Legislators Estimates of the United States Congress. Although I will not use 
this dataset in chapter 4 or 5, the dataset has been helpful in mapping which Texan legislators 
are Democrats and Republicans, which of them have further served in the United States 
Congress, and other facts that were especially helpful in sub-chapter 3.1. The data set is also 
the source for figure 3.1.   
 
4.3.3. The Almanac of American Politics and the Cook Partisan Voting Index  
The Almanac of American Politics is a reference work by Barone and other contributors. It 
has been published biennially since 1972 (Barone and Cohen 2009). In The Almanac of 
American Politics every legislator in Congress and their congressional district has been 
analyzed. In addition population data, including economical and demographical data, and 
election data is gathered and provided at the federal-, state- and congressional district level 
(see Barone and Cohen 2009:13-16 for a more detailed analysis of which data is provided in 
the Almanac).   
 The Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI) will also be used as a guideline for how 
partisan the congressional district is. This index was introduced in 1997, has been included in 
every Almanac of American Politics since 2000. The PVI compares the presidential 
performance to a party at the district level with the performance at the national level23. The 
PVI will be revisited in chapter 4 (Barone and Cohen 2009:17-18, Wasserman 2013).  
                                                
 
22  The Texas House of Representatives legislator estimates text-file may be downloaded here: 
ftp://voteview.com/JUNKORD/TEXAS_HL01020A21.DAT  (see Poole (2014a) in the bibliography for the full 
reference)  
23 The PVI uses the mean result of the two last presidential elections. Barone and Cohen use the elections of 
2004 and 2008 as an example. John Kerry won 48.8 percent of the national vote in 2004, while Obama´s share 
was 53.7. This gives a mean of 51.2, as the national democratic value and 48.8 is the Republican national value. 
If then a County gave 60 percent to the democrats it would have a PVI of D+9 since it voted 9 percentage points 
more democratic than the nation as a whole (Barone and Cohen 2009:17-18).  
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The advantage of using the Almanac is that they most often use the same measures in 
their demographical data and election data. A disadvantage is that several editions are not that 
easily available, or has a long delivery time from online bookstores. Therefore the following 
editions of the Almanac of American Politics are used in this thesis:  2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 
2010, 2012 and 2014. These are the editions that have been available at libraries in Norway, 
and on electronic library sources like Ebrary. 
The downside of having few editions of the Almanac available is that this reduces the 
time span of the thesis to 2001-2013. This will be further described in chapter 6.   
 
With the legislators dataset mentioned in part 4.3.1 as a basis I have punched in data from the 
Almanac of American Politics, and created my own dataset24. In chapter 5 the data that has 
been selected and punched in will be further described and operationalized.  In the next part  
the method chosen in this thesis will be analyzed.   
                                                
 
24 Feel free to mail me at bkdanbolt@gmail.com if you like a copy of the dataset and Stata do-file used in this 
thesis.   
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4.4. Method - Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis  
To answer the research question as best as possible, and with the data available, a quantitative 
methodological approach is the preferred one in this thesis.  The method chosen is a time-
series-cross-section analysis (TSCS) since it addresses both time and space, but also may cope 
with the limitations in the dataset. TSCS (often called for pseudo panel, repeated cross-
sections analysis or pooled cross-sectional time-series) has become a more common 
methodological approach in the later years, since it gives researchers the possibility to move 
beyond the limitations of a cross-sectional design. Worrall and Prat consider panel and TSCS 
models as: “… one of the best designs for the study of causation”. Since causation is a large 
part of the research question this strengthens why I have chosen this design (Worrall and Prat 
2004:35, Verbeek 2008:406-407, Baum 2006:44-45).   
 
The TSCS models often follow this generic form (Worrall and Prat 2004:36):     
 
yit =xitß+eit; i=1,...,N; t=1,...,T 
 
Here i is the unit of analysis, which is the legislators representing Texas in the House of 
Representatives. t is the time dimension, which is in Congresses (97th to 113th Congress), 
where one Congress lasts for two years. y is the constant term when x = 0. x is the 
independent variable and e = the error term to the regression.  
 
In the following sections I will discuss the differences between an ordinary panel data set and 
the data set used in this thesis, what constraints this lays for the model, and some of the 
elements one needs to be aware of when working with TSCS models.   
 
4.4.1. Panel-data or not panel data 
The data set, reviewed in part 4.4.1, is a TSCS data set which gathers data both over time and 
cross-sectionally (Worrall and Pratt (2004:35).  This may remind of a panel data (which also 
has the time and cross-sectional dimension), but one must be aware of some of the differences 
in estimation techniques. The major difference is that panel data requires that it is the same 
units that are followed over all the time periods. This is regarded as an advantage of panel 
data models since: “The availability of repeated observations on the same units allows … 
more complicated and more realistic models than a single cross-section or a single time 
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series would do” (Verbeek 2008:355). Both TSCS-models and panel models make it possible 
to see differences within one system at each point in time (Beck 2001:273-274).   
 
TSCS data, and especially the dataset used in this thesis have many of the same advantages as 
a regular panel data set. Since it is the legislators that are the unit of analysis in the data set in 
this thesis, they follow, in some degree, the assumption of a panel data set. This is because the 
large majority of the legislators are elected to more than one session in Congress, which 
makes it possible to follow how the legislators develop ideologically over time.  But 
legislators are at some time point be replaced by either losing elections or retirement, and 
therefore the assumption that one need to follow the same units over time, which a panel data 
set requires, is violated (Verbeek 2008:355).           
Another unit that is analyzed in this thesis is the Congressional Districts. The 
Congressional district also changes in shape and in population due to redistricting, migration 
or constituent sorting (see Appendix, section 10.1.).  The changes in Congressional Districts 
will be further examined in part 5.2.1. A third unit of analysis is the parties and how they 
change over time. This unit is created by sorting the legislators after their party label. This 
will be further explained in chapter 6.  
 
A way of treating the data set is as repeated cross-sectional data. Verbeek maintain that: “… 
several models that seemingly require the availability of panel data can also be identified 
with repeated cross-section…” (2008:407). On the other hand and, as mentioned earlier the 
large majority of legislators take part in several Congresses, and therefore it is possible to see 
how these legislators develop ideologically. An advantage is that common problems with 
panel data like nonresponse and attrition is far less frequent with TSCS (Verbeek 2008:407).  
There are several challenges and assumptions to be aware of when working with 
TSCS models. These will be explained in section 4.4.3, but first we will see what is most 
appropriate of a random effects or a fixed effects model.  
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4.4.2. Fixed effects or Random effects 
When operating with ordinary panel data models it is a common question if one should use a 
fixed effects- or random effects model. The Fixed Effects (FE) model may be equated as 
follows:    
 
yit = xit´ß + ai + uit 
 
The FE-model assumes that all the explanatory variables (xit) are independent of the error 
term (uit), and ai is the unobserved time-invariant individual effect (Verbeek 2008:359-362, 
407). The FE- model only observes the within effects, and all unobserved effects are excluded 
from the model. The advantage is that this model cannot experience heterogeneity bias. This 
makes it quite “safe” to use a FE-model, and may explain why it is a quite popular method in 
several sciences. A drawback with the FE-model is its incapability in estimating the effects of 
higher-level processes. With the higher-level processes excluded from the model this creates a 
serious loss of information that the model is unable to estimate (Bell and Jones 2015:138-139)  
 
An alternative to the FE-model is the Random Effects (RE) model. The RE-model assumes 
that “… all factors that affect the dependent variable, but that have not been included as 
regressors, can be appropriately summarized by a random error term” (Verbeek 2008: 364).   
The equation for a RE-model is usually like this (Bell and Jones 2015:135):   
 
yij = ß0j + ß1x1ij + eij 
  
A Hausman test is a common test in deciding whether a FE or RE-model should be used. The 
test generates a null hypothesis where the independent variables (xit) are uncorrelated with ait. 
If the null hypothesis is violated, the most common approach is to operate with a FE-model. 
The Hausman test is just a supplementary test since the thesis operates with TSCS data. Since 
the data is a series of independent cross-sections, which are not capable of tracing the 
development within the individual units, it is logical to assume that the xit are independent of 
the uit. For most scholars a FE-model is therefore used (Verbeek 2008:407).  
The Hausman test has been scrutinized later years, and according to Bell and Jones it 
is  “neither necessary nor sufficient to use the Hausman test as the sole basis of a researcher´s 
ultimate methodological decision” (2015:139). The essence for my methodological choice 
should be what the research question actually asks for. Bell and Jones claim, “…explicating a 
	   49	  
method that fails to answer your research question is nonsensical” (2015:139).  They argue 
that a RE-model is more preferable than an FE-model since it may analyze both the within- 
and between effects in a better way, in addition to being more flexible and generalizable. 
Their main point is that “…a well-specified RE model can be used to achieve everything that 
FE models achieve, and much more besides” (Bell and Jones 2015:135).   
As mentioned in the previous section, this data set is not a “plain” TSCS data set, 
since we may follow the majority of the legislators over time, and both the within and 
between effects are interesting to test. Therefore both a RE-model and FE-model is chosen in 
the analysis, and this will be further explained in section 6.2.1.  
 
4.4.3. Challenges and assumptions when working with TSCS and panel data 
models  
 
Endogeneity and direction of causality 
If the independent variables are correlated with the error term in a regression model 
endogeneity, (also called simultaneity), is encountered. This is quite often a problem with 
time series, where the direction of causality may go both ways, and in some cases the “wrong 
way”. An example may is that the legislators’ ideology (the dependent variable) affects 
income (one of the independent variables) instead of the other way around. A common 
method is to lag either the independent or dependent variables to ensure that causality goes in 
the right direction (Kjær 2011).  
Briefly revisiting the discussion held in section 2.3.3 it is a debate among scholars 
which direction the causality actually goes. For instance Dalton argues that the causality goes 
from the constituency (independent variables) to the legislators (dependent variable) (see 
figure 2.1). Levendusky on the other hand claim that the causality moves in the other 
direction and that the legislators ideology affect the constituency’s ideology (Dalton 
2008:223, Levendusky 2009:9). With this scholarly dispute over the direction of causality in 
mind I maintain that lagged dependent- or independent variables may destabilize and weaken 
the model. It is worth noting that in this thesis the direction of causality goes from the 
independent variables to the dependent. This will be more thoroughly discussed in chapter 7.
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Non-stationary and unit roots 
According to Worrall and Prat, “[a] fundamental assumption underlying the analysis of TSCS 
data is that they are stationary. In formal terms, data are stationary if their means, variances, 
and autocovariances (at various lags) remain across all time points” (2004:38).  
A Fisher-type unit roots test based on an augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test is a 
way of detecting if the assumption of stationary is fulfilled. This is done with the commands 
xtfisher and xtunitroot in the Stata software. If the p-value is close to 1 this means that the 
data is non-stationary and therefore the TSCS-assumption is violated. In the methodological 
sciences a lot of groundbreaking research has been done during the last decades to analyze 
TSCS-data that are non-stationary. What has been the most common treatment has been to 
first-difference the data or create a random-walk model, but Beck and Katz argue that these 
techniques create underspecified and weak models. Their simple solution is to do nothing at 
all. They argue that the stationary-assumption has been overestimated in the literature. Since 
TSCS-data often cope with short periods of time (20-40 years) it is hard to estimate wheter 
these data would have stationary or not over a longer time period. Their key argument is the 
consistency of the data and that the standard errors do not walk far from their means (Beck 
and Katz 2011:342-343).  
In this thesis the large part of the data set only spans over eight Congresses (106-113). 
How this is treated will be discussed in section 6.2.1. 
 
Autocorrelation 
In regression analysis one of the assumptions is that the covariance between the different error 
terms equals zero. Autocorrelation (also known as serial correlation) may occur: “…when two 
or more consecutive error terms are correlated” (Verbeek 2008:104).  
When operating with time series data, autocorrelation is recognized as a common issue 
since correlation in the error term of one or more consecutive periods may occur. When 
operating with panel data or TSCS data one might “…expect the different error terms of an 
individual to be correlated” (Verbeek 2008:105). The Woolridge Test for first order 
autocorrelation, by using the command xtserial in Stata, will be used to detect autocorrelation. 
The Woolridge Test generates a null hypothesis of “no first order autocorrelation”. This 
method uses the residuals from a regression in first-differences, and provides a null 
hypothesis that there is no serial correlation (Drukker 2003, Verbeek 2008:104, Midtbø 
2012:112).    
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Heteroskedasticity and Panel Heteroskedasticity  
Heteroskedasticity is present when the variance to the error term depends on the values of the 
explanatory variables (Midtbø 2012:106). This violates the assumption that the error term 
should be homoscedastic, and is a common problem when working with cross-sectional 
models. In TSCS and/or panel data models a unique form for heteroskedasticity called Panel 
heteroskedasticity may be encountered. This form for heteroskedasticity “…allows the error 
variances to vary between unit to unit while requiring that they be constant within each unit 
(Worrall and Prat 2004:45, Veerbeek 2008:89, Beck 2001:276).   
The Stata software provides a Modified Wald Test by using the command xttest3, 
which shows if the heteroskedasticity is present or not. If the p-value is 0 heteroskedasticity 
occurs. A way of treating panel heteroskedasticity is to adjust the standard errors, and inflate 
them in light of the panel structure of the data. Beck and Katz have called this approach for 
Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) (Beck and Katz 1995, Worrall and Prat 2004:38).  
In addition, running a GLS-regression (Generalized Least Squares) will check for 
heteroskedasticity (Midtbø 2012:109).   
In order to deal with both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity PCSEs will be 
applied. It is regarded as a sufficient way to deal with these problems. But for further research 
it would have been more ideal to some way try to model the heteroskedasticity, and deal with 
it in that manner.   
 
Multicolliniearity  
Multicolliniearity occurs when one or several of the independent variables are correlated with 
each other. This may affect and inflate the standard error to the dependent variable, making it 
challenging to identify the size of the coefficients. One may also encounter great changes in 
the results even if this is based on minor adjustments in the model (Midtbø 2012:128-129, 
Verbeek 2008:43-44).  
 Midtbø suggests two measures in both finding and treating multicolliniearity. The first 
is the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), defined as 1/1-R2 where in a regression one of the 
explanatory variables is explained by the other explanatory variables. If a variable encounters 
a VIF-score of over 10 it is regarded as being multicolliniear (Midtbø 2012:129).   
How this is dealt with will be mentioned in section 6.2.1.  
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5. Operationalization of variables   
In this chapter the dependent variable (part 5.1) and independent variables (part 5.2) will be 
operationalized and further explained. In part 5.3 a table of all the variables used in this thesis 
is provided.   
 
5.1. The dependent variable: DW-NOMINATE 1st dimension of the 
legislators ideological position  
In the 1980s Poole and Rosenthal developed a multidimensional scaling technique to place 
and measure legislative roll-call behavior. The scale was named NOMINATE an abbreviation 
for nominal, three-step estimation. According to Poole and Rosenthal: “Nominal referred to 
the dichotomous nature of the observed roll-call-voting decisions. The three steps were the 
estimations of the legislator ideal points, the roll-call-voting decisions, and a parameter of the 
legislator utility function” (Poole and Rosenthal 2001:6).  Poole and Rosenthal’s latest 
contribution to the Nominate-scale is the DW-nominate25, were D and W stands for dynamic 
and weighted (Poole and Rosenthal 2001:6).   
 Poole and Rosenthal claim that “…through most of American history two dimensions 
account for between 85 and 90% of roll-call-voting decisions” (2001:7). The first dimension 
is an economic liberal/conservative dimension, which has almost always divided the two 
major parties. The second dimension highlights more regional differences within and between 
the two parties on issues regarding race and civil rights. Poole and Rosenthal argue that the 
first dimension (liberal/conservative) and second dimension (race/regional) merged into one 
in the 1960s. Today race-related issues are closely correlated to economic issues and therefore 
are regarded, and therefore the two dimensions have “collapsed into one unidimensional 
liberal/conservative space” (Poole and Rosenthal 2001:7, 19-20 and 2007:316).     
 The Basic Space theory, developed by Converse in the 1960s (in Poole and Rosenthal 
2001:7) is the ideological framework for Poole and Rosenthal´s DW-nominate scale. 
Converse´s theory analyzes how most issues are bundled together, calling “…this bundling of 
issues constraint – the ability, based on one or two issue position, to predict other (seemingly 
                                                
 
25  For a deeper and more comprehensive explanation of the different NOMINATE-scales, were the 
mathematical equations for the NOMINATE-scale is provided, I recommend reading Poole and Rosenthal: 
Ideology and Congress (2007), Carroll, Lewis, Lo, Poole and Rosenthal (2009) and Poole and Rosenthal (2001).  
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unrelated) issue positions” (Poole and Rosenthal 2001:7). Based on the constraint hypothesis 
Poole and Rosenthal argued that most voting positions are predictable over most of the issues 
are voted over in Congress. They called this voting for ideological voting (Poole and 
Rosenthal 2007:3).  
  Based on the constraint hypothesis the DW-nominate operates within Euclidian space 
and ranges of -1 (ultra liberal) to 1 (ultra conservative). 0 means complete moderate. One 
important feature is that the DW-nominate allows legislators to exceed the -1 to +1 
continuum, but the large majority of legislators may be placed within these thresholds. The 
DW-nominate needs to be weighted26, but this is quite an easy process since the weight on the 
first dimension always is 1.0. Therefore for instance a legislator with a DW-nominate score of 
0.67, weighted with 1 equals 0.67 (0.67 x 1.0 = 0.67) (Poole 2004).  
The DW-nominate have some critics, although indirectly. One of the critics of using 
ideology as a way of scaling and measuring legislators is Lee. She argues: “Congressional 
parties hold together and battle with one another because of political interests, not just 
because of members ideals or ideological preferences” (Lee 2009:3). Lee argues further that 
not all cases are ideological, and not all cases may be placed on a “liberal” or “conservative 
scale” (Lee 2009:5). Lee has another focus, instead of looking at how conflict between the 
parties has escalated, she analyzes: “how party can organize conflict on matters that extend 
far beyond ideological disagreements between liberal and conservatives” (2009:20). For Lee, 
an important part of this “organized conflict” is how the president affects the party label.      
Having this critique in mind, the advantages of using the DW-nominate as a tool of 
measuring legislators’ ideology exceeds the downsides, and therefore will be used as the 
dependent variable in this thesis. Further on the DW-nominate is a very frequent tool in 
measuring legislators´ ideological positions, and have in the later years been globalized. 
Legislatures like the United Nations General Assembly, the European Parliament and several 
State Legislatures have been analyzed with help of the DW-nominate scale (Poole 2005, 
Poole and Rosenthal 2007:295-296, Shor and McCarty 2011).   
 
 
                                                
 
26 For the DW-nominate´s second dimension the weight is 0.3938, so this is a more delicate job to weight. The 
second dimension is not used in this thesis (Carroll et al. 2015).    
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5.2. The independent variables  
5.2.1. Redistricting – significant redistricting or no change 
In operationalizing the redistricting variable Carson et al.’s method will be used (2007). By 
using population data and comparing maps of congressional districts from 1962-2002, Carson 
et al. categorize congressional districts into three different categories after every round of 
redistricting: significantly redistricting (new), modest redistricting (continues) and no change 
(2007:885).   
Carson et al. define a continuous district (a district that has been modestly redistricted) 
as: “one where at least 50% of the population from the old district remains in the redrawn 
district” (2007:886). Carson et al. use the same definition for a district that has experienced no 
change. In a new district (one that has been significantly redistricting) more than 50% of the 
population has changed after the redistricting session according to Carson’s et al. model 
(2007:885-886).  
It is the districts that have been significantly redistricted that will be tested. Since 
Texas has reapportioned a total of 6 seats from 2000-2015 (or 12 seats all together from 1970 
until present (see table 2 for more details)), this means that every district has in some way 
been redrawn, but not every district has been significantly redrawn. Carson et al. acknowledge 
this and therefore labels districts that have either been modestly redistricted or experienced no 
change both as continues districts (Carson et al. 2007:885-887).     
There are some weaknesses with Carson et al.’s model that needs to be addressed. 
First of al is that Carson’s et al. model uses population change as a criteria. The population 
growth Texas has experienced in the last decades has created a natural change in the 
congressional districts population. In 2000 most congressional district had an average 
population of 550000. In 2010 this had increased to 700000 (Barone et al. 1999, 2013). This 
means that population must be used with caution when classifying the new districts. Changes 
in the demographic composition of the district will be a helpful tool to see if there have been 
population changes. A second weakness with Carson et al.’s model is that is hard to check 
which districts they argue have been significantly redistricted or not.  
The classification of districts as significantly redistricted or no change is based on 
historical maps gathered from The Texas Legislative Council (2012) combined with 
descriptions of the districts gathered from the Almanac of American Politics (2000-2013) and 
Bickerstaff (2007). These will be punched into a dummy-variables simply called redistricted, 
where districts that have experienced significant redistricted will be labeled 1 and no change 
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as 0.  The starting point is 2000 since this is the first Almanac I have available. In the 
appendix maps of Texas Congressional Districts from 2000 to 2012 is provided. Below is a 
table over which districts that has been categorized as significantly redistricted or not. 
 
Table 5.1: Categorization of districts as significantly redrawn or no change  
Congress 
(years) 
Number 
of 
districts 
Signifi-
cantly 
redistricted 
=1 
No 
change 
=0 
Districts redrawn Notes Sources 
106 
(1999-
01) 
30 0  30 -  This is the starting point for 
the examination therefore 
every district is labeled 0. 
There have of course been 
several redistricting 
sessions prior to the 106th 
Congress, but this is not 
included in the thesis.  
Map A 
(see 
appendix 
for all 
maps) 
Barone et 
al. 1999 
 
107 
(2001-
03) 
30  0 30 -  Districts followed the same 
redistricting plan 
Map A 
Barone et 
al. 1999 
 
108 
(2003-
05) 
32 6 26 6th, ,19th, 21st, 24th 
31st, 32nd   
Texas gained two seats 
after the 2000 census. 2001 
Redistricting plan for the 
2002 elections 
Map B 
Barone et 
al. 2003  
 
109 
(2005-
07) 
32 15 17 1st, 2nd, 4th, 6th  , 
8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 
14th, 17th, 19th, 
21st, 24th, 25th, 31st   
Special redistricting session 
held in 2003, applied for 
the 2004 elections (109th 
congress) 
Map C 
Barone et 
al. 2005 
Bickerstaff 
2007 
110 
(2007-
09) 
32 5 27 15th, 21st, 23rd, 
25th, 28th 
A 2006 U.S District Court 
order made adjustments to 
the 2003 plan 
Map D 
Barone et 
al. 2009 
111 
(2009-
11) 
32 0 32 -  Map D 
112 
(2011-
13) 
32 0 32 -  Map D 
113 
(2013-
15) 
36 11 25 2nd, 6th, 8th, 14th, 
17th, 25th, 27th, 
33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th   
Texas gained 4 seats after 
the 2010 census. 2011 
redistricting plan for the 
2012 elections 
Map E 
Barone et 
al. 2013 
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5.2.2. Constituent sorting – rural, white, black and Hispanic    
To test constituent sorting I will use parts of Theriault’s methodological framework and parts 
of the findings gathered by Pew Research Center (Theriault 2008:chap. 5, Pew 2014:42-47).  
Theriault compares over time how congressional districts have become increasingly 
homogenous both according to race and income (2008:91).  The Pew Study finds 
conservatives prefer living in communities where: “the houses are larger and farther apart, but 
schools, stores and restaurants are within walking distance”. The preferences of consistent 
liberals are almost the exact inverse, with 77% preferring the smaller house closer to 
amenities” (Pew 2014:42).   
 The constituent sorting explanation will be operationalized into four variables, with all 
the data provided by the Almanac of American Politics. These are: Rural, white, black and 
Hispanic. The Almanac provides several other demographical data among them the size of the 
congressional district and how many living in urban or rural areas27.  
  The first variable tests if congressional district with a high percentage of the 
population living rural areas elect more conservative legislators. Here the independent 
variable is “Rural”.  In addition the Partisan Voting Index (PVI), first mentioned in part 3.3.4, 
will be used as a helpful tool to measure the “partisanship” of the congressional district. The 
PVI variable will not be a part of the Models computed in section 6.2, but will be used in the 
analysis.  
To manage to use the PVI in Stata I will do some small adaptions to the variables’ 
notations. The PVI is originally noted R+8 meaning that the district is 8 percentage points 
more Republican than national average, or D+22, which means that the district is 22 
percentage points more Democratic than the national average. Instead of using R+ or D+, 
democratic districts are labeled with a minus. A minus is used because liberal ranges from 0 
to -1 in the DW-nominate-scale. Even districts are labeled 0. This means that a democratic 
district will be labeled for instance -8 (instead of D+8) and a republican district will be 
                                                
 
27 According to the United States Census Bureau own classification for the 2010 Census Urban areas are 
regarded as either densely populated areas with more than 50000 people (called Urbanized Areas (UA)) or urban 
clusters (UC) which are territories with a population between 2500-50000 people. Rural areas: ”…encompasses 
all population, housing, and territory not included within an urban area” (U.S. Census Bureau 2014). Note that in 
this thesis I will use population data from different Censuses. For the 1990, 2000 and 2010 censuses there where 
some slight variations in how the Census Bureau has defined urban and rural.  
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labeled 8 (instead of R+8). An example of the PVI is that R+8 becomes 8, while D+8 
becomes -8.  
 For which party residents register to vote28 (also called Party ID) is often used to 
measure the partisan sorting of a constituency. This is not possible to use in Texas since this is 
one of very few states that do not require party registration prior to elections.  The PVI in 
many ways gives a similar measure as the Party ID.   
Race is the last measure that will be operationalized in this sub-chapter. As mentioned 
briefly in part 4.1 Poole and Rosenthal claim that the racial dimension (which is the second 
dimension in the DW-nominate) score has merged with the liberal/conservative-dimension. 
They, with several other scholars like Hayes and McKee (2012), McCarty et al. (2006) and 
Bickerstaff (2007) maintain that white residents often are more conservative than black 
residents and other races.  
 The test in this case is to see whether race has any impact on the legislator’s 
ideological position. The Almanac gives detailed measures of the racial composition of the 
residents in every Congressional District. Here I have used the percentage of white, black and 
Hispanic residents. Note that “white” and “black” is treated like races, while Hispanic is 
treated like “ethnicity”. This means that a resident in a district may be classified as “white” of 
race, but of Hispanic origin and therefore are included in both measures (Barone et al. 
2013:17).    
 
5.2.3. Economic explanation – Mean household income and poverty status 
In operationalizing the economic explanation I will use two measures. The first is based on 
the mean household income of the Congressional District, a measure also used by McCarty et 
al. (2006:48).  An issue with this measure is that Almanac of American Politics uses three 
different categorizations of household income: mean household income and median 
household income. The income variable is divided by 1000, so that for instance 50300 
become 50,3 in the dataset. This is to make it more comprehensible when comparing it to the 
demographic and rural variables, which spread from 0-100 percent.    
Another measure used to highlight the economic explanation is the percentage of 
residents 16 years and older living under the poverty line. The poverty line was in 2007 
                                                
 
28 In most states people need to register to vote to actually be entitled to vote in the forthcoming election. When 
they do this they often get the choice of registering as a “Democrat”, “Republican” or “Independent” (O´Connor 
and Sabato 2008: Chap. 13).  
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defined by the United States Federal Government: “as a family of four living on about $21000 
or less a year”, which is around $29000 less than the mean household income in the United 
States (Barone and Cohen 2009:16,33). The poverty measure is not included in the Almanac 
for 2000 and 2014 and therefore further limits the time-span of the analysis from the 108th to 
the 112th Congress. This is a cause of concern that will be raised in chapter 6.  
 
5.2.4. Party activism – Tea party legislators  
To operationalize party activism a dummy variable is created where the legislators affiliated 
with the Tea Party Movement (first mentioned in part 3.1.5) are given value 1 while the rest is 
given the value 0.  
  Who of the legislators who are categorized as Tea Party-legislators are based on 
sources like the Almanac of American Politics and several established newspapers and 
magazines, like The New York Times, Fox News, The Dallas Morning News and The 
Atlantic. It has been an important part of the classification to be cautious and critical, 
especially to the newspaper sources. Therefore the legislators given the Tea Party brand (and 
therefore 1 in the Dummy-variable) are frequently mentioned as Tea Partiers or affiliated with 
the Tea Party. Table 5.2 provides a list of the Tea Party-legislators and what source this is 
given, and table 5.3 provides the number of Tea Party-legislators and other Republicans in 
each Congress analyzed.     
Tea Party Caucus was first established in 2011, but several of the members had been 
members of Congress for several years prior to the Tea Party’s emergence on the national 
scene. An interesting aspect is to see if the Tea Party-legislators traditionally have been more 
conservative. Therefore these legislators are given the score 1 for every session they have 
been in Congress, even for the sessions prior to the formal establishment of the Tea Party 
Caucus.  Table 5.2 shows the number of Republican legislators who are affiliated with the 
Tea Party-Movement (given value 1) and non-affiliated members, simply called “other 
Republicans”. Table 5.3 also shows how the Tea Party-group within the Congressional 
Delegation of Texas has grown over the years.       
Using just Tea Party-legislators as the variable of measuring party activism may of 
course be a source of critique. In the theoretical review of party activism analyzed in part 
2.3.5, many of the scholars look at the parties convention delegates rather than grass root 
activists. However tracing down how the convention delegates operate is quite a hefty task. 
More important the convention delegates are more relevant when it comes to presidential and 
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party politics, rather than congressional elections. Also when it comes to the research question 
and method, the legislators is the unit of analysis, therefore I see it as more relevant to look at 
features of the legislators, rather than features of convention delegates – which is not a unit of 
analysis in this thesis. The rise of the Tea Party-movement has become an important field of 
research, and trying to create a link between Tea Party-affiliation and ideology is quite an 
interesting task. This will be tested section 6.2.5 and may be seen in figure 6.2.  
 
Table 5.2: List of Texas legislators affiliated with the Tea Party Movement and source  
Legislator Congressional District Years in Congress Source 
Louie Gohmert  1st  2005- Barone et al. 2013:1578-1579 
Fox News Insider 2011 
Ted Poe 2nd  2005- Fox News Insider 2011 
Ralph Hall 4th 1981- (Hall switched 
parties in 2003 and joined 
the Republican Caucus) 
The Herald Democrat 2010 
Joe Barton 6th  1985- Fox News Insider 2011 
The Dallas Morning News 2010 
John Culberson 7th  2001- The Dallas Morning News 2010 
Ron Paul 22nd (1976-1977, 1979-
85), 14th (1997-2013) 
1976-1977, 1979-85, 
1997-2013 
The Atlantic  
Randy Neugebauer  19th  2003- Fox News Insider 2011 
Lamar Smith 21st  1987- Fox News Insider 2011 
Quico Canseco 23rd  2011-2013 The New York Times 2010 
Kenny Marchant 24th  2005- Fox News Insider 2011 
Michael Burgess  26th  2003-  The Dallas Morning News 2010 
Blake Farenthold 27th  2011-  Barone et al. 2013  
John Carter 31st 2003- The Dallas Morning News 2010 
Pete Sessions 5th (1997-2003), 32nd 
(2003-) 
1997- Fox News Insider 2011 
 
Table 5.3: Number of Tea Party-legislators compared to other Republicans in the 
Congressional Delegation of Texas, 106-113th Congress  
Congress Tea Party-legislators Other Republicans  Total Republicans 
106 4 9 13 
107 5 8 13 
108 8 9 17 
109 12 9 21 
110 12 7 19 
111 12 8 20 
112 13 10 23 
113 12 12 24 
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5.3. Overview of variables 
I will end this chapter with an overview of the variables used in this thesis.  
 
Table 5.4: Overview of dependent variable and independent variables  
Variable-name  Description Type of variable Theory  
 
Dependent variable 
DW-nominate  First dimension) in the 
DW-nominate. Measures 
the Liberal/conservative-
continuum  
Metrical  
 
Independent variables 
Redistricted A district where more 
than 50 percent of the 
population has changed 
or the district has been 
significantly redrawn 
after a redistricting 
session = 1 
Dummy Redistricting 
Size  Area size of the 
congressional district (in 
square miles) 
Metrical/Continuous Constituent sorting 
Rural Percentage of residents 
in the Congressional 
District living in rural 
areas 
Metrical/Continuous Constituent sorting 
PVI Cook Partisan Voting 
Index 
Descriptive (will not be 
used in the regression 
models)  
Constituent sorting 
White Percentage of whites 
living in the 
Congressional District 
Metrical/Continuous Constituent sorting 
Black Percentage of blacks 
living in the 
Congressional District 
Metrical/Continuous Constituent sorting 
Hispanic  Percentage of Hispanic 
origin living in the 
Congressional District 
Metrical/Continuous Constituent sorting 
Income Mean Household Income  Metrical/Continuous Economic  
Poverty Percentage of residents 
living below the poverty 
line 
Metrical/Continuous Economic 
TeaParty  Legislators affiliated 
with the Tea Party 
Movement = 1 
Dummy Party activism 
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6. Analysis 
The research question (see part 1.1.) in this thesis actually comprises three questions. First: if 
the legislators from Texas in the House of Representatives have polarized, second: if the 
constituency affects the legislators, and third: if theories generated at the federal level, may 
explain polarization within a state’s congressional delegation. The analysis will look first and 
foremost at the first two parts of the research question, while part three will be answered in 
chapter 7. In part 6.1 I will analyze the first part of the research question, which compares 
polarization in the Texas congressional delegation over time. Part 6.2 will analyze if the 
constituency affect the legislators ideological score. In this part the hypotheses generated in 
chapter 3 (see table 3.3 in part 3.2.) will be tested.  
 Based on the results in both part 6.1 and 6.2 a discussion over the theoretical 
framework and its relevance will be carried in chapter 7. The level of significance chosen is 
around 5 percent (where p = 0.05 and t-values exceed around + 2).  
 
6.1. Polarization in the Texan congressional delegation 
The first part of the research question asked:  Has there been an increase in polarization 
between the Democratic and Republican members of the Congressional Delegation from 
Texas in the House of Representatives between the 97thth and 113th Congress? 
 
The approach made to answer this question was to group the Texas legislators after party 
affiliation (Republican or Democrat) at every time point in the dataset by creating a dummy 
variable where Democrats where labeled 0 and Republicans labeled 1. Thereafter a two-
sample t-test with equal variances comparing the DW-nominate score by the party dummy 
was done in Stata for every other time period (97th, 99th, 101th, 103rd, 105th, 107th, 109th, 111th 
and 113th Congress).  
 
The same procedure was carried out with the rest of the legislators29 in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, excluding the Texas Representatives.  This was to get a more fruitful 
analysis, and it is an interesting aspect in itself to compare Texas with the rest of the United 
                                                
 
29 Three of the legislators in the House of Representatives in this time period (Sanders, VT, Goode, VI and 
Foglietta, PA) were elected as Independents. These are set as missing values and are therefore not included in the 
analysis.  
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States. The t-test computes both the mean DW-nominate score for the Republican and 
Democratic legislators, as well as the difference between them. The t-test also measures the 
mean for all the legislators combined, as well as the standard error, standard deviation, and of 
course the t-value, which measures whether the results are statistically significant or not. The 
t-values for all the tests comfortably exceed the critical value of +2 and the results are 
therefore statistically significant. The results are shown in figure 6.1:  
 
 
 
As figure 6.1 clearly tells us there has been an increasing polarization between the Republican 
and Democratic Legislators within the Texas congressional delegation, and the gap between 
them has been growing steadily since the 97th Congress. The Texas Republican legislators 
DW-nominate score has increased from 0,57 in the 97th Congress to 0,8 in the 113th Congress. 
At the opposite level the Texas Democrats have in the same period decreased from -0,14 to -
0,34. An interesting finding is that the Democrats on the national level have remained quite 
stable, with the DW-nominate score only dropping from -0,3 to -0,37 in the entire time 
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Figure 6.1: Mean Democratic and Republican  DW-nominate score (1st dim.) 
(Texas compared to the rest of the U.S. House of Representatives) 
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period. In addition figure 6.1 tells us that the Texas Democrats have been quite more 
conservative than their fellow legislators at the national level, but since the 109th Congress 
their score has been almost identical.   
 
The Texas Republicans have for most of the time period been clearly more conservative than 
the rest of the House Republicans, but since the 109th Congress the gap has been less than 0,1 
points in the DW-nominate score. The astonishing fact is that it is the Republicans at the 
national level that have had the most remarkable increase in the DW-nominate score of all the 
groups of legislators in figure 6.1, and therefore have contributed the most to the increasing 
polarization. In the 97th Congress the gap between the Democrats and Republicans at the 
national level were at 0,54 points. In the 113th Congress the gap were at 1,09 points.   
 
The mean for all the legislators is included to see the ideology of the House of 
Representatives. At the national level (the grey stapled line) the DW-nominate has had a 
mean around 0 for most of the time period, but has increased to 0,2 in the 113th Congress. For 
the Texas delegation the increase has been more remarkable. Equaling the national level with 
a mean around 0 it increased remarkably between the 107th and 109th Congress, reaching a 
mean of 0,42 at the 113th Congress. All these results prove that there has been an increase in 
polarization between the Democratic and Republican legislators, both in Texas as well as at 
the national level. In addition it shows that the Texas delegation in general has become more 
conservative. The results showed in figure 6.1 will be further discussed in chapter 7.   
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6.2. The constituency and legislators ideological score 
 
This section will analyze if the congressional district have any affect on the legislator’s 
ideological position. This may be recognized as a more complex question than the first one in 
this analysis, since it includes several more variables combined with the addition of data from 
other sources. In the first part I will go through the treatment of the data and problems 
encountered. I will operate by using two models with three different regressions in each. The 
results will be presented and analyzed in sections 6.2.2 to 6.2.5, and further discussed in 
chapter 7.    
 
6.2.1. Treatment of data and problems encountered 
Reduction of time span and non-stationary  
When including the data from the Almanac of American Politics (reviewed in chapter 4 and 
5) the time dimension of the analysis is reduced from the 106th to the 113th Congress. When 
the variable Poverty is included the time span for the analysis is further reduced to 108th to 
112th Congress, reducing the number of observations from 255 to 159. With such a constraint 
on the time span and number of observations it is worth asking if it is feasible to include the 
poverty variable in the analysis. Still Poverty is one of the variables that I would prefer testing 
since it is essential in explaining H4, where I look at the link between poverty level in the 
congressional district and legislators’ ideology. My solution will be addressed in the 
following sub-chapter.    
Since the time span is quite short the assumption of stationary or non-stationary is 
hard to trace, and therefore I follow Beck and Katz’s guidelines mentioned in part 4.4.3 (Beck 
and Katz 2011:342-343).        
 
Multicolliniearity  
The VIF-test, as seen in table 6.1, proves that the variables White and Hispanic exceed the 10-
point threshold by solid margins, and are therefore multicolliniear. The mean VIF is as high 
as 15.77. A correlation test shows they correlate quite strongly with each other. By doing 
several VIF-test I find that the root to the multicolliniearity problem is the variable poverty. If 
poverty is dropped from the model the mean VIF drops to 1.43, and the issue with 
multicolliniearity disappears at the same time as the numbers of observations increase from 
159 to 255.  
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Midtbø argues that it is not desirable to drop a variable to solve the problem of 
multicolliniearity, since this most often leads to a weaker model. A solution he provides is to 
merge two of the explanatory variables (Midtbø 2012:157-158). The root to the 
multicolliniearity issue is that income is closely linked to poverty. Instead of merging the two 
variables I maintain that the income variable explains the poverty variable in a satisfying way. 
In addition the income variable also gives enough data to analyze the economic explanation 
mentioned in part 2.3.4 and 3.1.4. But to be able to test hypothesis nr 5 the poverty variable 
still needs to be included. Therefore two models are created in this analysis: Model 1, which 
includes all the variables, and Model 2, where the poverty variable is excluded.  
 
Table 6.1: Comparison of VIF scores, Model 1 and Model 2  
Variables VIF – Model 1 VIF – Model 2  
White 47.98 2.42 
Hispanic 43.09   3.02 
Black 12.65 2.05 
Poverty 11.96   -  
Rural 4.24 1.56 
Income  3.88 1.51 
TeaParty  1.26 1.23 
Redistricted  1.12 1.05 
Mean VIF  15.77 1.83 
VIF < 10 = multicollinear 
 
 
Hausman test – FE and (or) RE-model 
For Model 1 the Hausman test does not manage to get a consistent result since the data fails to 
meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test. This is most likely due to the huge 
multicolliniear issues with this model.  
For Model 2 the Hausman test has a p=chi-squared that equals’ 0.00, meaning that the 
test prefers a FE-model. With the discussion in 4.4.2 in mind I regard it as unsatisfying to use 
only a FE-model. In reverence of the large scholarly tradition of respecting the results of the 
Hauman test, but combined with Bell and Jones’ (2015) genuine endorsement of the RE-
model in mind, I will apply both the RE- and FE-estimation techniques in Model 1 and 2.      
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Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity   
The Modified Wald test (which measures heteroskedasticity) and the Woolridge Test (which 
measures autocorrelation) both have a p-value = 0. This proves that autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity is present in both models.  
Robust standard errors will be applied to both the FE and RE-model. Although this 
deals with parts of the autocorrelation problems, a Linear Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression with PCSEs manages to correct for both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, 
and will therefore be added to both models.  The samples are grouped pairwise, which include 
all variable observations with non-missing pairs. The PCSEs manage to “…correctly 
measures the sampling variability of the OLS estimates” (Beck 2001:278), and is included to 
make sure that the model provides as realistic results as possible.  
 
This leads us to two models with three regressions in each:  
1) Fixed Effects with robust standard errors 
2) Random Effects (Generalized Least Squares) with robust standard errors 
3) Linear regression (Ordinary Least Squares) with Panel Corrected Standard Errors  
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6.2.2. Results from Model 1 and 2.  
 
Table 6.2: Model 1 – Three regression models including all explanatory variables   
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: 
DW-nominate (1st 
dimension) 
 Fixed Effects 
Regression 
Random effects 
regression with 
Generalized Least 
Squares 
Linear Regression with 
Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors 
 
Independent Variables 
 Coeff. 
(St. Err.) 
P-value  Coeff.  
(St. Err.) 
P-value Coeff.  
(St. Err.) 
P-value 
        
Redistricted  -.0205 .193 -.0242 .109 -.1410* .0534 
  (.0155)  (.0151)  (0.073)  
Rural  .0007 .661 .0008 .628 .0013 .417 
  (.0017)  (.0016)  (.0016)  
Income  .0035* .0573 .0047** .0158 .0102** .0124 
  (.0018)  (.0020)  (.0040)  
Poverty  -.0004 .922 .0016 .701 -.0048 .723 
  (.0043)  (.0041)  (.0136)  
White  -.0028 .216 -.0006 .800 .0120*** .0001 
  (.0022)  (.0022)  (.0031)  
Black  .0047 .334 .0010 .831 -.0049** .0454 
  (.0048)  (.0045)  (.0025)  
Hispanic  -.0003 .521 -.0005 .311 .0017 .323 
  (.0004)  (.0005)  (.0017)  
TeaParty  -.0128 .567 .104 .228 .3610*** .000 
  (.0222)  (.0862)  (.0461)  
        
Constant  .284 .265 .0732 .768 -.7580** .0434 
  (.252)  (.2480)  (.376)  
    
Observations  159 159 159 
R2  Within = .254 
Between = .135 
Overall = .187 
Within = .17 
Between = .508 
Overall = .462 
.716 
Number of groups  43 43 43 
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Table 6.3: Model 2 – Three regressions models (excluding poverty)    
 
Dependent variable: 
DW-nominate (1st 
dimension) 
 (1) 
Fixed Effects 
Regression  
(2) 
Random effects 
regression with 
Generalized Least 
Squares 
(3)  
Linear Regression with 
Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors 
 
Independent Variables 
 Coeff.  
(St. Err.) 
P-value  Coeff.  
(St. Err.) 
P-value Coeff.  
(St. Err.) 
P-value 
        
Redistricted  -.0199 .179 -.0148 .339 -.0296 .698 
  (.0147)  (.0154)  (.0761)  
Rural  .0029 .360 .0034 .227 -.0047*** .000 
  (.0031)  (.0028)  (.0013)  
Income  .0043*** .006 .0055*** .0002 .0150*** .0004 
  (.0015)  (.0015)  (.0018)  
White  .0002 .309 .0003 .256 .0007 .463 
  (.000230)  (.0002)  (.0010)  
Black  .0027 .255 -.0009 .676 -.0153*** .000 
  (.0023)  (.0022)  (.0009)  
Hispanic  .0006 .489 -.0013 .160 -.0078*** .000 
  (.0008)  (.0009)  (.0016)  
TeaParty  .0617*** .000 .2050** .034 .3270*** .000 
  (.0072)  (.0968)  (.0356)  
        
Constant  -.0029 .981 -.0055 .965 -.0998 .511 
  (.120)  (.1260)  (.152)  
     
Observations  255 255 255 
R2  Within = .268 
Between = .455 
Overall = .452 
Within = .231 
Between = .599 
Overall = .624 
.693 
Number of groups  55 55 55 
 
For both models: Robust standard errors in parentheses except for the linear regression with Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs). 
Statistically significant: *** p< .01 (1 percent level), ** p< .05 (5 percent level), 
* p< .1 (10 percent level). 
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Before I analyze the results presented in Model 1 and 2, it is worth mentioning some of the 
two errors one can make when testing hypotheses. The first is a type I error, where one rejects 
the null hypothesis although it is actually true. A type II error occurs when the null hypothesis 
is not rejected although it is not true. It is commonly acknowledged the doing a type I error is 
more severe than doing a type II error (Verbeek 2008:31, Midtbø 2007:64-65).  
The p-value is used to classify the results as statistically significant or not. Briefly 
explained the p-value (abbreviation for probability value) “denotes the marginal significance 
level for which the null hypothesis would still be rejected” (Verbeek 2008:32). In addition the 
p-value is also useful in seeing how well the variable works. The higher the p-value the less 
trustworthy the variable is.   
R-squared (noted as R2) measures how well the estimated regression line fits the 
observations in each regression in the model, as well as how much of the variation in the 
dependent variable that may be explained by the variation in the independent variables. It 
spans from 0 to 1 where 1 means that the variance in the dependent variable is explained by 
the independent variable. Called the goodness-of-fit or coefficient of determination, R2 is a 
very popular measure, but has several shortcomings that one needs to be aware of. R2 will 
automatically increase when independent variables are added to the model, and it tends to be 
higher in time-series models than in traditional cross-section models (Midtbø 2007:87-88, 
Skog 2004:224). I will still use the R2 as a measure of how well each regression works, but 
with some caution.   
 In the two next sections I will analyze Model 1 and 2 and each of the three regressions 
within each model. Here I will test the hypotheses generated in chapter 3 (see table 4, part 3.2, 
for an overview of the hypotheses) and also see how the hypothesis may be attached to the 
theoretical framework analyzed in Chapter 2.   
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6.2.3. Analysis of Model 1  
 
I will start by analyzing Model 1 where the poverty variable is included. This gives the Model 
a time span from the 108th to 112th Congress, and 159 observations. Due to the issue of 
multicolliniearity in this model I will be quite cautious in emphasizing the results.   
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the second part of the research question asked “does the 
congressional district have any affect on the legislators ideology?” The essence in this 
question is that factors within the constituency drag the legislators in either a liberal or 
conservative direction, which again creates more party polarization. The factors that are 
operationalized is poverty level, white, black, Hispanic, rural and income. All of these have in 
common that they span from 0-100 in percentage, and income, which is household income 
divided by 1000. Therefore one may compare the coefficients between these variables30.  
In addition two dummy variables are included, redistricted and TeaParty. As a 
reminder the DW-nominate spans from + 1, so for instances a coefficient in the variable 
income of .01 means that the DW-nominate increase with .01 for every $1000 the median 
income in the district increases. Although the coefficients in both tables may seem small, it 
may have a larger impact on the DW-nominate scale than a first impression may give.  
    
Analyzing the three regressions models seen in table 6.2 we first see that the Fixed Effects 
regression (FE) does not manage to explain anything at all. The overall R2 is low as .187, 
while the between and within R2 does not spread far from the overall value. The only variable 
that has a significant result is Income with a p-value of .057, making significant at the 10 
percent level. The remaining variables have p-values that are far from accomplishing any 
significant or reliable results.  
 One may see the same trends in the Random Effects GLS-regression (RE) as well.  
Income is the only variable that is significant, and has a p-value of .016. The redistricted 
variable is close to being significant at the 10 percent level. Although the between effects R2 
of the overall R2 has quite higher than in the FE-model, the score is still .51 and .46.  
                                                
 
30 It is of course possible that a congressional district may have a mean household income that surpasses 
$100.000, which divided by 1000 would go beyond the 0-100 scale. But in the data gathered from the Almanac 
of American Politics none of the Congressional Districts in Texas, regardless of time period, had a mean 
household income exceeding $100.000.  The highest income noted is 83.724 (3rd district, 113th Congress), the 
lowest is 17.866 (15th district, 106-107th Congress) and the mean income is 40.252.     
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  The regression with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) works far better than 
the RE- and FE-model. The R2 is .72, meaning the model works quite well. White and the 
TeaParty- dummy variable are significant at the 1% level, the black, income and the Constant 
term are significant at the 5% level, while redistricted is close to being significant at the 5% 
level with a p-value = .053.       
 
An interesting finding is that the three regression models have many similar results, with 
some clear exceptions. All three regressions have significant results for the income. This 
strengthens the economic explanation, which especially McCarty et al. (2006) endorse. The 
constant term has the largest difference between the three regressions with a coefficient 
ranging from .77 in the RE, .28 in the FE to -.76 in the PCSEs, but only the PCSEs that 
provides a significant result.    
 
The Poverty variable does not give any reliable results in any of the three regressions, with p-
values ranging from .7 to .92, exceeding the 5 percent level of significance threshold with 
wide margins. This means that technically the alternative hypothesis generated in H4, which 
said, “The higher the poverty rate, the more liberal the representative from the district is” is 
rejected. It seems clear from these results that there is no link between levels of poverty in the 
district and the ideology to the districts legislator. This will be further discussed in chapter 7.  
 
It seems clear that the issues with autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and multicolliniearity 
especially affect RE and FE in Model 1, although the standard errors are robust. PCSEs 
correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, but still the issue of multicolliniearity is not 
dealt with in a satisfying manor in this model. Although the results from the PCSEs look 
trustworthy I will not emphasize the results from Model 1 in the rest of the analysis due to the 
issue with multicolliniearity. In the next section I will analyze Model 2.   
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6.2.4. Analysis of Model 2 
By dealing with the multicolliniearity issue by simple excluding the poverty variable we get a 
much more reliable Model (as seen in table 6.3) than when we analyzed Model 1 (table 6.2), 
but still there are large differences between the three regressions-models in Model 2.  
 
The number of observations has increased from 159 to 255, and the span is now from the 
106th to 113th Congresses. The R2 values in FE have increased to .46 (between) and .45 
(overall). In RE the R2 values are .6 (between) and .62 (overall). In PCSEs the R2 value has 
decreased slightly from .71 in Model 1 to .69 in Model 2, but this may be since Model 1 
includes one more variable then Model 2. This also shows a weakness with using R2 in 
explaining the goodness-of-fit. I will maintain that an R2 of .69 proves that the PCSEs-model 
works decently.  
 
The FE-regression in Model 2 still does not work properly, and only Income and TeaParty 
have significant results with P-values close to 0, making it significant on the 1 percent level.  
These are the only variables that are significant in the RE-model as well.    
 
The PCSEs provides the most reliable results since it correct for autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity, and multicolliniearity, and therefore I will emphasize these results the 
most. Every variable except for Redistricted, White and the Constant term have significant p-
values at the 1 percent threshold. The remaining variables have p-values spanning from .46 to 
.69, which is far above the significant threshold. It is an interesting finding that the 
redistricted and the constant term goes from having significant results in PCSEs regression in 
Model 1 to none significant in Model 2.   
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6.2.5. Comparing results from Model 1 and 2 with theory, and answering the 
hypotheses 
 
Many of the results in Model 1 and 2 are in line with the expectations made in chapter 2 and 
3. But parts of the results also contradict the expectations made earlier in this thesis. Based on 
the results it is easy to understand why there is a general lack of agreement among scholars in 
explaining party polarization. In the following parts I will briefly go through how the results 
from the remaining variables in both models cope with the theoretical expectations.   
 
Redistricting  
The Redistricting variable only had significant results in the PCSEs in Model 1. Here the 
coefficient was quite negative with -.14. All the regression estimates in both models have 
negative coefficients. This contradicts the hypothesis that legislators from redistricted districts 
are more ideologically conservative; they are in fact slightly more liberal. The time dimension 
may help explaining this surprising result. Prior to 2003 the Democrats controlled the 
Redistricting process. Although with the Republican spectacle of the 2003 special 
redistricting session, the 2010 session carved out four new Democratic districts to compensate 
for the immense growth in the Hispanic population (Barone et al. 2013:1566-1567). The shift 
in control between the two parties over the redistricting process, may explain the negative 
coefficients in both models.    
On the other hand since I used Carson et al.’s (2007) methodological framework (see 
part 5.2.1) it is a bit surprising that the variable did not provide significant and reliable results. 
The results show that Carson et al.’s model does not work for Texas in the time span chosen 
for this thesis. But in defense of Carson et al. it may have been too few districts and to short a 
time span, to actually test Carson et al.’s method. But the results indicate that the critics of the 
Redistricting explanation like McCarty et al. (2006), Poole and Rosenthal (2007) and 
Abramowitz et al. (2006) have valid arguments to counter-argue the redistricting explanation. 
Due to lack of trustworthy results H1 is rejected.  
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Rural  
H2 is based on parts of the Constituent sorting explanation (see part 2.3.3), and the Pew 
Research Center’s (2014) report that maintained that conservatives preferred living in rural 
areas and liberals preferred “walkable” communities in urban areas.  
In the analysis it was only in the PCSEs in Model 2 that the rural variable had a 
significant result. A bit surprising was that the coefficient was negative, with -.0047, meaning 
that the congressional districts with large rural areas are slightly more liberal in rural than in 
urban areas. The other regressions in both models had a minimal positive coefficient. Either 
way the effect is quite small, so the theoretical expectation that the more rural the more 
conservative was not met in this analysis.  
 There may be some explanations for why the rural variable did not meet the 
expectations made in chapter 2 and 3. First of all there may be a mismatch between the Pew 
Research Center’s definition of urban/rural and the US Census Bureau´s definition, which is 
used in the Almanac of American Politics. By revisiting the Pew Study Report I see that Pew 
looks at sub-urban areas as “rural”. In the U.S. Census Bureau’s definition, rural is really on 
the countryside, while suburbs are classified as “urban” (Pew Research Center 2014, United 
States Census Bureau 2014a).  Several of the Congressional Districts in Texas with almost no 
rural population, like the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 22nd, 24th, 26th and 32nd, are solidly Republican districts 
with PVI spanning from R+10 to R+20 (Barone et al. 2013:1580-1670).  
 The ideological realignment explanation, which was analyzed in part 2.3.2 and 3.1.2, 
is also factor that may explain the negative coefficient. The rural areas in Texas used to be 
dominated by Conservative Democrats, who switched allegiance and became Republicans in 
the later part of the 20th century (Cunningham 2010:193). Still the Democrats managed to 
control a large part of the rural areas in Texas until the 108th Congress. Although the rural 
Democratic legislators tended to be conservative they were far from being equally 
conservative as their Republican successors (Cunningham 2010, Bickerstaff 2007, Barone et 
al. 1999, 2013).      
 
White, Black and Hispanic  
In both Model 1 and 2 variables white, black and Hispanic, which controls for race and 
ethnicity, were included. Admitting that race was not thoroughly explained in the theoretical 
framework I regard it as a natural part of the constituent sorting explanation. Race has also 
been seen as an important factor in the ideological realignment explanation (see part 2.3.2 and 
2.3.3) (Theriault 2008, McCarty et al. 2006, Bickerstaff 2007:4-6).  
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It is not a surprising result that black has a negative coefficient of -.0153 in the PCSEs 
regression in Model 2, meaning that the legislator becomes increasingly liberal the higher the 
percentage of black residents in the neighborhood.  It is only in the PCSEs regressions that the 
race variables provide significant results. In the PCSEs in Model 1 one may see that white has 
a positive coefficient of .012, assuming that white congressional districts tend to elect more 
conservative legislators. But in the PCSEs in model 2 the results is not significant and the 
coefficient is close to zero. The Hispanic variable has contradicting results in the PCSEs 
regressions when we compare the models. In model 1 the coefficient is close to 0, while we 
have a slight negative coefficient in Model 2.  
 Why the white and Hispanic variables do not indicate clear results may be explained 
by looking at the demographical composition of Texas, which was analyzed in section 3.1 
(see table 3.1). Nearly 75 percent of the Texan population is white, 38 percent is of Hispanic 
origin, while only 11,7 is black. It´s is obvious that even if a slight majority of the white 
population favor the Republicans, large parts of the white population also vote Democratic  
(Barone et al. 2013:1564). With the exception of black residents, it seems clear that there are 
other factors than race that determine what elements within the constituency that affect the 
legislators ideology. This may also explain why race it is not a highly favored explanation in 
the literature on party polarization.  
 
Income    
Income was the only variable that had significant results in all regressions in both models. 
The PCSEs regression in Model 2 coefficient of .015 shows that the mean income of the 
constituency has quite an impact on the legislator’s ideology, where the higher income the 
more conservative the legislator is. The results prove that McCarty et al. and other scholars 
that support the economic explanation (mentioned in part 2.3.4) may have valid arguments 
when they claim that rising income inequality explains the increase in party polarization 
(McCarty et al. 2006). McCarty et al. claimed that voters increasingly identified themselves as 
either Republicans or Democrats after the size of their wallet, where high-income voters 
supported Republicans (2006:48,71). The results in Model 2 support McCarty et al.’s 
argument. By performing a t-test where I group the Democratic and Republican legislators 
and summarize the mean household income, I get the following results in table 6.4.  
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Table 6.4: Mean household income sorted after Democratic or Republican 
representative 
Congress (Years) Democrat 
(Std. deviation) 
Republican 
(Std. deviation) 
Difference  T-value 
106  
(1999-01) 
$23683 
(3316.6) 
$32152 
(8029.5) 
$8469 -3.95 
107  
(2001-03) 
$23683 
(3316.6) 
$32152 
(8029.47) 
$8469 -3.95 
108  
(2003-05) 
$33817 
(4079.9)  
$47127 
(11378.6)  
$13310 -4.40 
109  
(2005-07) 
$31722 
(2260.4) 
$44937 
(9077.1) 
$13215 -4.72 
110  
(2007-09) 
$34476 
(7719.7) 
$44268 
(8584.3) 
$9792 -3.30 
111  
(2009-11) 
$36580 
(4262.2)  
$52501 
(9024.2) 
$15921 -5.71 
112  
(2011-13) 
$35710 
(4147.7) 
$50765 
(9640.2) 
$15055 -4.49 
113  
(2013-15) 
$38640 
(4126) 
$56040 
(12068.2) 
$17400 -4.83 
Summarized $31471 
(7039.3) 
$46559 
(12256.3) 
$15087 -11.45 
Source: Barone et al. 1999-2013, Carroll et al. 2015. T-test computed in Stata.  
 
Table 6.4 we may see that both Democrats and Republican have had a considerable increase 
in household income, but this has been genuinely higher among Republicans. The table shows 
that the difference between the two parties has more than doubled from $8469 in the 106th 
Congress to $17400 in the 113th Congress. When considering the quite short time span in this 
thesis this is a quite remarkable increase.   
 The increase in income differences between the constituencies to the Democrats and 
Republican legislators goes hand in hand with the arguments given by McCarty at al. (2006). 
Increasing economic differences seems as a valid and compelling argument in both explaining 
legislators behavior and party polarization. All the regression estimates from this variable are 
statistically significant which proves that there are valid reasons to accept H3.  
Still I will maintain that the economic explanation does not tell the entire story, and 
that there are other factors contributing as well, which will be further discussed in the next 
chapter.  
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TeaParty  
As seen in the PCSEs regression in both models and FE and RE in Model 2, the TeaParty 
variable has a significant positive effect on the DW-nominate, meaning that legislators 
affiliated with the Tea Party movement are generally more conservative than their Republican 
colleagues. This supports H5. Still the variable has quite different results across the three 
different regressions in Model 2, from quite a slight coefficient of .062 in the FE, to .205 in 
RE, to a more remarkable .327 in the PCSEs regression. As discussed earlier the PCSEs 
regression is regarded as the most compelling regression model among the three regressions 
in this thesis. But with the dubious results about the effect, an additional t-test where I 
compare the Tea Party legislators’ mean DW-nominate score with the remaining Republicans 
score to help answer the hypothesis. The results computed in the t-tests may be seen in figure 
6.2.    
 
 
Figure 6.2 shows that Tea Party-legislators have traditionally been slightly more conservative 
than their Republican colleagues. But that difference has decreased in the last Congresses, and 
the DW-nominate scores have been close to identical, even after the formal establishment of 
the Tea Party Caucus in 2011 (112th Congress). An unexpected finding is that the Tea Party-
legislators were slightly less conservative in the 113th Congress than the other Republicans, 
but with almost identical scores (.79 and .8).  
An important note is that the t-test did not generate significant results, with t-values 
ranging below the critical threshold of +1,96. Therefore I would use some caution in 
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emphasizing the result from figure 6.2. The insignificant results are most likely explained by 
too few observations. As seen in figure 3.1 and table 5.3 the number of Republican legislators 
in the Texan Congressional delegation only ranges from 12 (106th Congress) to 25 (107th 
Congress). In addition there is quite a similar number of Tea Party-legislators and other 
Republicans, which might create some disturbances in the test results.  
Still figure 6.1 and 6.2 give clear indications that Texan Republicans are some of the 
most conservative members in the U.S. House of Representatives, regardless of Tea Party 
affiliation, but that the Tea Party legislators may have been a factor in dragging their fellow 
legislators increasingly to the fringe of the ideological dimension.     
   
After the review of the variables I conclude with the following verdicts to the hypotheses in 
this thesis in table 6.5.   
 
Table 6.5: Answer to the hypotheses  
Nr.  Hypotheses Theoretical 
explanation 
Accept or reject the 
alternative hypothesis  
H1 Legislators from redistricted 
districts in Texas are more 
ideologically conservative in the 
U.S. House of Representatives  
Redistricting  Rejected 
H2 Legislators from rural districts 
are more conservative than 
legislators from urban districts 
in Texas.   
Constituent sorting Rejected 
H3 The higher the mean household 
income of a district, the more 
conservative the legislator is.   
 
Economic explanation Accepted 
H4 The higher the poverty rate, the 
more liberal the representative 
from the district is.  
Economic explanation Rejected 
H5 Tea-Party-Legislators are more, 
and have traditionally been 
more, ideologically 
conservative.  
Party activism  Accepted (but with some 
doubts)  
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6.3. Summary of analysis  
 
In this chapter I have divided the research question into two sections and empirically tested 
each part. In section 6.1 I find that there has been an increase in polarization between the 
Republican and Democratic legislators from the 97th to 113th Congress. An interesting finding 
was that the Texas legislators generally were more conservative than the rest of the 
representatives. But since the 109th Congress the Texas Republican and Democratic 
representatives have nearly equalized with the rest of the U.S. House Representatives DW-
nominate score. In addition to confirming that the House has polarized, as seen in figure 6.1, 
the results indicate that the parties has become more ideologically cohesive, both in Texas and 
nationwide.  
 In section 6.2 I approached the second part of the research question, if the 
congressional district affects the legislators ideological position, which was done by running 
three regressions (FE, RE and PCSEs) in two separate models. Model 1 included all the 
independent variables, and Model 2 excluded the poverty variable. The PCSEs in Model 2 
gave the most reliable results, and only the income and TeaParty variables managed to meet 
the theoretical expectations made in chapter 2 and 3. Of the five hypotheses tested in the 
analysis only H3 and H5 were accepted. The results from the analysis tend to favor the 
economic explanation (first addressed in section 2.3.4.). So for this thesis it seems clear that it 
is only the Congressional districts mean income that has any affect the legislators’ ideological 
position.     
 In the next chapter the results from the analysis will be further discussed and will be 
closer linked to the theoretical framework of this thesis. Here I will also give a more 
comprehensive answer to the research question.  
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7. Discussion 
In this chapter I will more thoroughly discuss and answer the research question, based on the 
results from chapter 6 and the theoretical framework laid out in chapter 2 and 3. I will also 
address some of the advantages and drawbacks of the design of this thesis. At last I will 
discuss the contributions of this thesis and some suggestions for future research. First, I will 
provide a short summary of the goals and design of this thesis.  
 
This thesis looks at party polarization within the United States House of Representatives, and 
whether the congressional districts may affect legislators’ ideology, which again may explain 
the rising polarization. In addition the thesis asks whether theories of polarization on the 
federal level explain polarization within a state congressional delegation.  Instead of looking 
at the entire House of Representatives the thesis has rather analyzed the legislators 
representing Texas. In section 3.1 I argued why I selected Texas as my case of research. The 
two key arguments were that Texas demographically is quite identical to the rest of the United 
States (see table 3.1) and that the theoretical framework for this thesis may be applied to 
Texas. In addition Texas was selected for practicable purposes, since I wanted to investigate 
the legislators´ Congressional District in more detail. This would have been challenging to 
carry out if I had tried to analyze more than the Texan Congressional Districts.   
For both the theoretical framework for the federal level (chapter 2) and for Texas 
(chapter 3) time is an important component. Therefore Texas was selected since it made it 
possible to analyze several more congressional districts over a longer time span. A Time-
Series-Cross-Section analysis has been used to implement the time dimension in this thesis.     
 
In chapter 2 I reviewed the scholarship on polarization. The theories may be divided into two 
large camps, the external explanations (section 2.3) and internal explanations (section 2.4.). 
Due to the limitations of the thesis it is hard to address both the external and internal factors. 
Therefore this thesis primarily addresses the external explanations, due to theoretical and 
methodological reasons. Since the larger part of the scholarship on polarization looks at 
changes outside Congress, I regarded it as applicable to address the external explanations. I 
see it as relevant to have some insight in the internal explanations, and this was therefore 
included in the theoretical framework. The internal explanations will be revisited later in this 
chapter when I discuss some approaches for future research.       
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7.1. Discussion of the results and research question   
 
Has there been an increase in party polarization?  
Section 6.1 gave clear results that there has been a significant increase in polarization between 
the Democrats and Republicans in the Texas Congressional Delegation as well as at the 
national level in the House of Representatives in the time span chosen for this thesis. The 
polarization has been as steep in Texas as in the rest of the U.S. House of Representatives, but 
as seen in figure 6.1 the parties in Texas and rest of the U.S. had different starting points. 
Both the Texan Democrats and Republicans were generally more conservative than the rest of 
the U.S. Republicans and Democrats. This finding will be discussed further later in this 
chapter, but first I will discuss the most robust finding in the analysis, which was the income 
variable.   
  
I maintain that income and the economic explanation is the most robust of the external 
explanations, and the results from the analysis prove that there is a link between income and 
ideology. H3 was the only hypothesis that was accepted without doubts, and it seems quite 
clear that congressional districts with high median income elect more conservative legislators.  
The empirical findings from the analysis strengthen McCarty et al.’s theoretical framework 
analyzed in chapter 2. Still I maintain that there are several other aspects that the models used 
in this thesis did not manage to embrace.   
 
As discussed in section 3.1.4 and seen in figure 3.3, there has for decades been quite a high 
level of income inequality in Texas, as well as the United States, with a Gini-Index of .42. 
Though the Gini-index increased in both Texas and the U.S, from .42 in 1979 to .48 in 2013 
in, the increase in polarization in the same time period has been even more remarkable.  With 
a history in Texas of “generously rewarding success while being unforgiving of failure”, it is 
actually a bit surprising that the distances in polarization were not larger in Texas prior to year 
2000 (Barone et al. 2013:1559). In spite of the fact that the income variable provides 
significant results, and the economic explanation seems as a plausible contribution, there must 
be other factors that play a large part in explaining party polarization as well.       
I regard the ideological realignment theory, which was discussed in section 2.3.2 and 
3.1.2, as an essential explanation in understanding some of the historical foundations of the 
rising party polarization especially in Texas. Scholars generally agree that the South was for a 
century dominated by the Democratic Parties one-party regime. Cunningham (2010) argued 
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that the conservative wing of the Democratic Party was the dominant one during this one-
party regime. This may explain why the Democrats in Texas generally were more 
conservative than their fellow legislators from the rest of the United States. A massive 
migration and the rise of conservative icons like Ronald Reagan contributed to what Poole 
and Rosenthal (2007) have called “the collapse of the southern Democratic Party”. In addition 
the 2003 special redistricting plan was an important component in sweeping out the last 
remainders of the conservative “Blue-Dog” Democrats in the House of Representatives, both 
in Texas, but also on the national scene, creating the final collapse of the Southern Democrats 
regime (Bickerstaff 2007).    
I contend that the rise of polarization in Texas is due to the fact that traditional 
conservative Democratic voters became even more conservative Republicans with the 
remaining Democratic Party becoming a liberal party for the black, Hispanic and the poor 
(Bickerstaff 2007:4-7). This is exemplified in figure 6.1. Still the Texas Republicans have in 
the same period become even more conservative and is the most conservative faction within 
the Texas Republican party.  
Increasing income inequality has fueled this growing polarization, which explains why 
the income variable gave quite clear results in Model 1 and 2. At the national level the largest 
increase in polarization is caused by the increasing conservativeness of the Republican Party.  
 
Does the congressional district affect the legislators’ ideology?   
Based on the literature and the results of the analysis it is plausible that the constituency affect 
the legislators ideology, but as seen in Model 1 and 2 there are some factors within the 
constituency that are more convincing than others.  As discussed, regarding the income 
variable in section 6.2.5, the analysis gave clear results that the congressional districts mean 
income affects the legislators’ ideology. The racial composition of the district also affects the 
legislators’ ideology. This is especially in black neighborhoods, which elect slightly more 
liberal members.  
 
Parts of the literature analyzed in section 2.3.1 and 2.3.3 provide compelling arguments for 
this part of the research question. The increasing partisan sorting since the 1970s, with liberals 
and conservatives clearly sorted into Democratic and Republican parties, has created 
“ideological echo chambers”, where voters live closer to their ideological soul mates. I will 
argue that redistricting fueled the constituent and partisan sorting process since mapmakers 
draw congressional districts as safe as possible.     
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In spite of convincing empirical results and compelling theoretical arguments, it is worth 
noting that neither the literature nor the results from the analysis give clear indications in 
which way the causality actually goes. This fact makes it hard to provide a clear answer 
whether the congressional district affects the legislators’ ideology.  
 
It might rather be that the legislator actually affects the congressional district’s ideology. 
Levendusky provides a compelling argument to the opposite way of causality. As analyzed in 
section 2.3.3, Levundusky claims that when the legislators sort to the each end of the 
ideological poles it clarifies what it means to be either a Republican or a Democrat (2009:3). 
The modern redistricting process is also a tool for the party elites to secure non-competitive 
and homogenous congressional districts where “...legislators are no longer chosen by their 
constituents, but rather that the constituents are chosen by the legislators” (2008:65).  
 
I will argue that the causality between the congressional district and its legislator ideology is 
mutual, rather than going strictly in one direction. When the Republican or Democratic 
legislators’ ideology is clearly conservative or liberal it is easier for the common voter to 
associate their ideological preferences with a party. Combined with the conflict extension on 
most issues during the last decades, it has become easier for voters to choose parties based on 
ideological preferences. The legislators have drifted so far away from each other, that for 
many voters the other party is not regarded as a viable option (Layman et al. 2006:89-93, 
Nelson (ed.) 2014:61).  
 
As discussed earlier we see that the results from Model 1 and 2 indicate that several aspects 
like racial and economic composition affect the legislators’ ideology. Another interesting 
effect is growing party activism among the grassroots. When most of the congressional 
districts are quite homogenous and non-competitive, this creates more room for the fringes of 
the electorate.  Exemplified with the Tea Party movement in this thesis, scholars have seen 
that the fringes of the electorate are quite capable of letting their voice get heard, and the 
legislators cannot ignore these ideological fringes of their own party. The surprising unseating 
of Majority Leader Eric Cantor, which I briefly summarized in section 2.3.5, is a striking 
example of how the congressional district may unseat their legislator, regardless of status, if 
he ignores the party activist trends within his own constituency (The New York Times 2014b, 
Skocpol and Williamson 2012).     
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A concluding remark is that the link between the congressional districts ideology and 
the legislators’ ideology goes in a mutual ascending spiral. When the legislators and their 
parties have drifted further apart to the ideological poles, this makes it easier for voters in the 
district to align their partisan and ideological beliefs. But changes in the constituency, and 
reduction of the electoral competitiveness create new ground for activist voices, which further 
pressures the legislators to the outskirts of the ideological poles.    
 This dynamic creates a challenge in providing a clear answer to the second part of the 
research question. Still the dynamic between the legislators and his/her constituency is an 
interesting aspect and important contribution to understanding the increasing polarization of 
the last decades.  
 
The results in section 6.2 deepen our understanding in why there has been a profound 
discussion among scholars of the various theories of polarization. It also show that one theory, 
or even one school of theories, may not explain party polarization as well as the shift in 
legislators’ ideology, but that the picture is more complex. Still the results show that some 
theories account more for polarization than others.     
 
May theories of polarization on the federal level explain polarization within a state 
congressional delegation? 
Theories generated at the federal level may partly explain polarization within a state 
congressional delegation. Especially the external factors like income, constituent sorting, the 
ideological realignment and the increase in party activism have been crucial in understanding 
the increasing polarization in the Texas Congressional Delegation since the 1970s.  
 Still every state has its own unique story, and the same may be said with the Texan 
case as well. But as analyzed in the chapter 3, what Cunningham has called for the 
“nationalization of state political culture” played an important role in realigning Texan 
politics, and creating the modern two-party system that the state has today (Cunningham 
2010:194). The analysis and theoretical findings in this thesis shows a clear indication that the 
large part of the polarization within the Texas Congressional Delegation may be explained by 
theories at the federal level.  
 In the current era of polarization it seems clear that it is the political trends at the 
national level that affects the legislators at the state level.   
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7.2. Answering potential criticism and suggestions for future research  
 
7.2.1. Answering potential criticism 
 
Is Texas the right case?  
With the slightly surprising results generated in figure 6.1, where the results clearly show that 
Texan legislators have traditionally been more conservative than the rest of the United States, 
it is worth asking whether Texas is the most appropriate case. Just using one state may be a 
source of critique, and using more cases may be appropriate in future research.  
One might ask if there are other states that resemble the United States even more, for 
instance California, New York, Florida or Pennsylvania. Still every state has its unique 
character and history, and when choosing one state this has to be dealt with. When I chose 
Texas the states unique features were analyzed in chapter 3, and with regard to the limitations 
of this thesis I regard Texas as the right case. Based on demographical data it is quite similar 
to the rest of the United States. And Texas has a history that makes it possible to test the 
theories implemented designed for the federal level.  
Still the most important aspect in why I choose Texas was that it made it possible to 
gather more detailed data on congressional districts, which again made it possible to test the 
link between the congressional districts and its legislators.  This would not have been 
achievable if I had to approach more states or all the Congressional Districts of the entire U.S. 
House of Representatives. 
    
Too weak models used in this thesis  
There are of course several other aspects that might explain the increasing polarization. And 
one might argue that there should be more variables implemented in the model. Even if 
variables like rural, redistricting, poverty and white did not provide clear results, all the 
variables used in this thesis have been carefully analyzed and operationalized, and are all 
based on the theoretical framework of this thesis.      
 I maintain that the Model 1 and 2 used in this thesis manage to test several of the most 
common external explanations, and that the variables used are properly operationalized.  
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Is the DW-nominate an appropriate measure and is the polarization real?  
As briefly mentioned in section 5.1 there is an interesting scholarly debate whether the DW-
nominate score actually is an appropriate tool for measuring ideology. Ideology is such a 
complex term that the DW-nominate score may give an impression that there are greater 
distances between the parties than there what is actually the case. And as Lee (2009) argues, 
most votes in Congress are not ideological. In lack of other measures, the DW-nominate is by 
far the most frequently used and is regarded as a very precise measure in explaining 
legislators’ ideology. Therefore I regard the DW-nominate measure as appropriate for 
measuring polarization.     
 An entire field of research, regardless of method, clearly concludes that there has been 
a significant increase in party polarization since the 1980s. And most scholars use the DW-
nominate score to explain this polarization. What actually explains polarization, is still an 
ongoing discussion among scholars. 
 
7.2.2. Suggestions for future research 
  
There are several aspects that this thesis did not manage to embrace, which should be further 
investigated in future research. Due to the limitations of time in this thesis it was not 
practically possible to investigate every one of the 435 Congressional Districts, especially 
over time.  A larger project should try to look at more Congressional Districts, and use more 
than one state as an example, where cross-comparisons over different states may be an 
interesting approach. Despite that the research on polarization is greatly expanding, there is 
done far too little research on how the state and constituency affect the states’ congressional 
delegation in Congress. There is also very little research conducted on State Legislatures, and 
whether there has been a similar increase polarization in State Legislatures as in the United 
States Congress during the same time span.          
 
In understanding polarization I would address scholars to investigate and do more research on 
the changes that have occurred on the inside of Congress. Though external explanations 
surely help explain the increasing party polarization, a finding in this thesis is that the external 
models do not manage to tell the entire story. I maintain that the largest bits in solving the 
polarization puzzle lies in conducting research on the inside of Congress.  
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For instance, when I analyzed the data for this thesis, a surprising finding was that the 
representative from the 4th district Ralph Hall´s DW-nominate score jumped from .073 to .505 
when he switched parties from Democrat to Republican in the 108th Congress (Carroll et al. 
2015). It was obvious that changes in his constituency could not explain this sudden and 
drastic increase in ideology. Therefore how things work on the inside of Congress and within 
the party ranks have their say in explaining legislators’ ideology and behavior.  
 In section 2.4 I briefly reviewed some of the internal explanations. These should be 
further investigated and tested, where a qualitative approach may be even more appropriate. A 
qualitative approach on polarization within Congress may provide an alternative to the 
scholarship on polarization, which has been dominated by quantitative method. Still there are 
several aspects of polarization where a quantitative method is the most suitable.       
 
 
7.3. Contributions  
 
This thesis has touched a new field of research within the vast scholarship of party 
polarization. By analyzing only one state, the thesis has managed to implement data from 
each of the Congressional Districts in Texas, and link them to polarization.    
 By doing this, the thesis has tested several of the most popular explanations for party 
polarization. The results from the analysis tend to favor the economic explanation, and it may 
therefore enhance McCarty’s et al. (2006) argument that increasing polarization is caused by 
the increase in income inequality. The thesis has also contributed with a comprehensive 
analysis of several of the most popular theories of party polarization. By comparing the 
arguments from several scholars the thesis has proved that there is a general lack of 
theoretical agreement.    
 At last the thesis has managed to test polarization by using one case. This may help 
future research to have an even more detailed approach, and create new paths in a field of 
research that is under constant development.   
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8. Conclusion 
 
From the 97th to the 113th Congress there has been a significant increase in polarization 
between the Democratic and Republican parties. By using data from voteview.com and the 
Almanac of American Politics this thesis has gone further into trying to explain whether the 
congressional district affects the legislators’ ideology.  
This thesis has had a comprehensive review and tested some of the most common 
explanations for party polarization. This has been possible by using Texas as a case and 
looking more thoroughly at the congressional districts and the political history in this state.      
  
One of the findings is that one should not mess with Texas, since the Lone Star State has sent 
some of the most hardline conservative legislators that the U.S. House of the Representatives 
has ever seen. An interesting finding is that their Republican colleagues have become almost 
equally conservative. On the other hand the thesis has demonstrated that the traditionally 
dominant conservative part of the Democratic Party has collapsed, and Texas Democrats are 
now as liberal as the rest of the Democrats in the House of Representatives.    
 Both models used in this thesis emphasize that the congressional districts mean 
household income affects the legislators’ ideology. As discussed it seems clear that there are 
other theories that the models used in this thesis do not manage to embrace, which also affect 
the legislators’ ideology. A finding is that internal explanations may equally well explain the 
increasing polarization as the external explanations, and that future research should address 
the link between the internal and external explanations.   
 By reviewing both the theories for polarization at the federal level and in Texas, the 
thesis sees a clear link between polarization at the federal and the state level. A finding is that 
state politics in general has become more nationalized, and that increasing polarization in a 
state congressional delegation may be explained by trends at the national level.          
  
By studying polarization, the undisputed finding is that the Democratic and Republican 
parties have drifted further away on separate ideological highways, and the distance becomes 
greater from Congress to Congress. Will the increasing polarization never end and will 
Congress be trapped in further gridlock? The causes and consequences of polarization deserve 
the attention from scholars worldwide, and maybe it is time for scholars to provide some bold 
solutions to solve the polarization puzzle.  
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10. Appendix  
 
Table 10.1: Congresses and Almanacs analyzed in this thesis  
Data for 97th to 105th Congress is collected from Voteveiw.com 
Congress 
(years) 
Almanac 
(Year) 
Notes Congress 
(years) 
(continued) 
Almanac 
(Year) 
(continued)  
Notes 
97 (1981-83)  -  24 districts.  106 (1999-01) 2000  
98 (1983-85) -  107 (2001-03) 2000  
99 (1985-87) -  108 (2003-05) 2004 Special redistricting 
session held in 2003 
100 (1987-89) -  109 (2005-07) 2006  
101 (1989-91) -  110 (2007-09) 2008  
102 (1991-93) - Redistricting 
to 27 districts 
111 (2009-11) 2010  
103 (1993-95) -  112 (2011-13) 2010   
104 -  113 (2013-15) 2014 New redistricting to 
36 districts 
105 -   
 
10.1. Congressional maps over Texas 1996 – present  
Map A (1996-2002)  
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Map B (2002-2004)  
 
Map C (2004-2006) (The Special Redistricting Plan)  
CAMERON
WILLACY
HIDALGO
KENEDY
EDWARDS
WHEELER
HOOD
COKE
CALLAHAN
LIMESTONE
TRAVIS
EL PASO
ANGELINA
HUNT
JACK
BREWSTER
KING
DIMMIT
TARRANT
SABINE
JACKSON
ATASCOSA
ELLIS
YOAKUM
COCHRAN
HALE
MARION
GARZA
REFUGIO
DELTA
BURNET
RED
RIVER
BRISCOE
CULBERSON
FR
A
N
K
LI
N
DALLAM
HAMILTON
BELL
ZAPATA
OCHILTREE
STONEWALL
HARRIS
COLORADO
GRAY
SMITH
HOWARD
BEXAR
FOARD
COMANCHE
POLK
HUDSPETH
JIM
WELLS
ANDREWS
RANDALL
GILLESPIE
ARANSAS
CLAY
DEAF
SMITH
MCCULLOCH
WHARTON
JEFF
DAVIS
FISHER
WEBB
TERRY
JASPER
CONCHO
LIVE
OAK
CAMP
LAVACA
HENDERSON
WALLER
SHACKELFORD
CRANE
GUADALUPE
SOM
ERV
ELL
FALLSIRION
LYNN
WOOD
WASHINGTON
YOUNG
KNOX
MILLS
CROSBY
PANOLA
BANDERA
TRINITY
POTTER
RAINS
BROOKS
TYLER
UPTON
COLLIN
SHELBY
SAN
PATRICIO
MCMULLEN
SCURRY
BROWN
UVALDE
CALHOUN
KINNEY
MCLENNAN
ORANGE
MENARD
MONTGOMERY
GONZALES
BAYLOR
BASTROP
ROBERTSON
BEE
AUSTIN
BURLESON
PRESIDIO
PARMER
SAN
JACINTO
M
O
R
R
IS
SUTTON
JOHNSON
LAMPASAS
HALL
CORYELL
GAINES
FLOYD
HOPKINS
MONTAGUE
HEMPHILL
TITUS
NOLAN
MILAM
KENDALL
UPSHUR
JONES
CALDWELL
HASKELL
GLASSCOCK
SAN
AUGUSTINE
REEVES
HARRISON
FREESTONE
SAN
SABA
MITCHELL
COOKE
KERR
BLANCO
TAYLOR
REAL
LUBBOCK
LIPSCOMB
NEWTON
DAWSON
PECOS
FORT
BEND
ARCHER
KENT
BRAZOS
LA SALLE
ANDERSON
ROBERTS
COTTLE
BORDEN
VICTORIA
MIDLAND
KIMBLE
WILBARGER
SCHLEICHER
OLDHAM
TERRELL
MATAGORDA
LAMB
WILSON
VAN
ZANDT
ZAVALA
WISE
MASON
REAGAN
GREGG
RUNNELS
CHILDRESS
EASTLAND
STARR
GRIMES
WILLIAMSON
CASTRO
RUSK
FRIO
FANNIN
ERATH
CASS
KAUFMAN
DE WITT
DALLAS
CARSON
HAYS
WINKLER
PALO
PINTO
WICHITA
MAVERICK
THROCK-
MORTON
HARDEMAN
COMAL
LLANO
COLLINGS-
WORTH
MADISON
NUECES
ROCKWALL
JEFFERSON
LEE
BOWIE
GALVESTON
MOTLEY
KARNES
HILL
STEPHENS
ECTOR
DUVAL
WARD
KLEBERG
JIM
HOGG
GRAYSON
HOCKLEY
NAVARRO
WALKER
LAMAR
NACOGDOCHES
HARDIN
SHERMAN
TOM
GREEN
SWISHER
MARTIN
LOVING
CROCKETT
HUTCHINSON
CHEROKEE
GOLIAD
MOORE
PARKER
VAL
VERDE
COLEMAN
DONLEY
MEDINA
FAYETTE
HARTLEY
BOSQUE
ARMSTRONG
CHAMBERS
STERLING
LIBERTY
HANSFORD
HOUSTON
BRAZORIA
DENTON
BAILEY
DICKENS
LEON
20
9
297
18
6
30
3224
3
12
26
2
8
4
1
5
10
22
17
14
27
15
25
28
21
31
16
23
11
19
13
Texas Legislative Council
Texas Congressional Districts
2004 Elections and 2006 Primaries
House Bill 3, 78th Legislature, 3rd Called Session (2003)
32 Districts
 
Acts 2003, 78th Leg., 3rd C.S., Ch. 2, eff. Jan. 11, 2004; PLAN01374C
09/05/08
	   97	  
Map D (2006-2010) 
Map E (2012-present)  
 
 
Source: Maps A-D: Texas Legislative Council (2012), Map E: U.S. Department of the Interior (2014).   
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The Constitution prescribes Congres-
sional apportionment based on 
decennial census population data.  Each
state has at least one Representative, no 
matter how small its population.  Since 
1941, distribution of Representatives has 
been based on total U.S. population, so 
that the average population per 
Representative has the least possible 
variation between one state and any
other.  Congress fixes the number of 
voting Representatives at each 
apportionment.  States delineate the 
district boundaries. The first House of 
Representatives in 1789 had 65 
members; currently there are 435.
There are non-voting delegates from 
American Samoa, the District of 
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the 
Virgin Islands.
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS
113th Congress (January 2013–January 2015)
